5 August 2015 by Truth Committee on the Greek Public Debt
Chapter 3, Greek public debt by creditor in 2015, presents the contentious nature of Greece’s current debt, delineating the loans’ key characteristics, which are further analysed in Chapter 8.
The institutions that created the Troika
Troika: IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank, which together impose austerity measures through the conditions tied to loans to countries in difficulty.
IMF : https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html are the main creditors to Greece, and as a group they apply tremendous pressure to secure their repayment. This chapter lays out the basic set of relevant issues that the Committee wants to highlight looking at the main current creditors - the EU member states, the EFSF, the IMF IMF
International Monetary Fund Along with the World Bank, the IMF was founded on the day the Bretton Woods Agreements were signed. Its first mission was to support the new system of standard exchange rates.
When the Bretton Wood fixed rates system came to an end in 1971, the main function of the IMF became that of being both policeman and fireman for global capital: it acts as policeman when it enforces its Structural Adjustment Policies and as fireman when it steps in to help out governments in risk of defaulting on debt repayments.
As for the World Bank, a weighted voting system operates: depending on the amount paid as contribution by each member state. 85% of the votes is required to modify the IMF Charter (which means that the USA with 17,68% % of the votes has a de facto veto on any change).
The institution is dominated by five countries: the United States (16,74%), Japan (6,23%), Germany (5,81%), France (4,29%) and the UK (4,29%).
The other 183 member countries are divided into groups led by one country. The most important one (6,57% of the votes) is led by Belgium. The least important group of countries (1,55% of the votes) is led by Gabon and brings together African countries.
http://imf.org , the ECB ECB
European Central Bank The European Central Bank is a European institution based in Frankfurt, founded in 1998, to which the countries of the Eurozone have transferred their monetary powers. Its official role is to ensure price stability by combating inflation within that Zone. Its three decision-making organs (the Executive Board, the Governing Council and the General Council) are composed of governors of the central banks of the member states and/or recognized specialists. According to its statutes, it is politically ‘independent’ but it is directly influenced by the world of finance.
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html and private creditors. We present the contentious nature of these debts, delineating their key characteristics, which are further analysed in Chapter 8. The majority of the loans received from the bailouts were used to repay existing debts. Approximately 10% of the bailout programme was used to finance the budget, as shown in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1 |1|
Use of official funding, 2010 to 2015
Public debt of Greece by component, as of 30/04/15 |2|
1. Bilateral Loans
• The pooled bilateral loans were set up in May 9 of 2010 and disbursed over six quarterly tranches. Total disbursements amounted to €52.9 billion. |3|
Composition of Bilateral Loans to Greece (millions euros)
• The bilateral loans are put into effect through the combination of the Intercreditor Agreement and the Loan Facility Agreement, as described in Chapter 4. It was declared that initiating these loans with a high interest Interest An amount paid in remuneration of an investment or received by a lender. Interest is calculated on the amount of the capital invested or borrowed, the duration of the operation and the rate that has been set. rate would act as an “incentive to return to market-based financing as soon as feasible”. |4|
• As a result of this policy choice €2,614 billion of interest payments were made to the member states by March 2012. |5| Set at the variable rate of 3-month Euribor
Euro Interbank Offered Rate The interbank rate used in the Eurozone. Established daily, it is the average of the transactions realised by a panel of the 57 most representative banks in the Eurozone. There are fifteen EURIBOR rates for terms ranging from one week to twelve months.
EURIBOR : http://www.euribor-rates.eu/panelbanks.asp plus 300 basis points extra charge for the first three years, |6| the original rates were onerous. With the Euribor rate peaking at 1.609% in August 2011 |7| the interest on the bilateral loans reached over 4.6%. As some of the creditor countries’ borrowing costs were lower than the lending rate, |8| some lenders profited out of the loans. The gradual easing of the loans’ terms, |9| currently at Euribor + 50 basis points is an implicit admission that the original terms were usurious.
• The loans were portrayed as if used to assist Greece in paying wages and pensions. Indicative of this portrayal is Eurogroup president Juncker’s statement that disbursements are used to recapitalise banks, pay wages, pensions and government suppliers. |10|] This is however misleading. The bilateral loans were used primarily for debt repayment: between May 2010 and September 2011 86% of the loans were used solely for debt repayment. |11| The remainder was not even used in its entirety for budget support, but rather to pay for the setting up of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund. |12|
• The EFSF, based in Luxembourg, was created in 2010 to preserve financial stability in Europe. |13| Nonetheless, by creating additional debts for individual member states, the scheme deteriorated the economic situation for Europe as a whole and especially for Greece.
• EFSF loans are financed through the issuance of funding instruments, which are backed by guarantees Guarantees Acts that provide a creditor with security in complement to the debtor’s commitment. A distinction is made between real guarantees (lien, pledge, mortgage, prior charge) and personal guarantees (surety, aval, letter of intent, independent guarantee). of euro-area member states. Guarantees were increased from €440.00 billion in 2010 to €779.78 billion in 2011. |14| By 2013, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Cyprus had stepped out from the EFSF changing the guarantees of the EFSF to €724.47 billion, which remains the current commitment. |15| As the number of highly rated guarantors of the fund dwindles, as occurred after France’s downgrade, so too does the stability of the EFSF. Eventually the scheme was replaced by the ESM ESM
European Stability Mechanism The European Stability Mechanism is a European entity for managing the financial crisis in the Eurozone. In 2012, it replaced the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, which had been implemented in response to the public-debt crisis in the Eurozone. It concerns only EU member States that are part of the Eurozone. If there is a threat to the stability of the Eurozone, this European financial institution is supposed to grant financial ‘assistance’ (loans) to a country or countries in difficulty. There are strict conditions to this assistance.
• The EFSF disbursed €141.8 billion of which €10.9 was returned on the 27th February 2015, leaving €130.9 billion debt to Greece. |16| BG [Accessed 15. June 12, 2015].]] From the total disbursed amount, €108.2 billion (76.3%) was disbursed in 2012, €25.3 billion (17.8%) in 2013, and €8.3 billion (5.9%) in 2014. The repayment of these loans will stretch to 2054.
• The interest rates
When A lends money to B, B repays the amount lent by A (the capital) as well as a supplementary sum known as interest, so that A has an interest in agreeing to this financial operation. The interest is determined by the interest rate, which may be high or low. To take a very simple example: if A borrows 100 million dollars for 10 years at a fixed interest rate of 5%, the first year he will repay a tenth of the capital initially borrowed (10 million dollars) plus 5% of the capital owed, i.e. 5 million dollars, that is a total of 15 million dollars. In the second year, he will again repay 10% of the capital borrowed, but the 5% now only applies to the remaining 90 million dollars still due, i.e. 4.5 million dollars, or a total of 14.5 million dollars. And so on, until the tenth year when he will repay the last 10 million dollars, plus 5% of that remaining 10 million dollars, i.e. 0.5 million dollars, giving a total of 10.5 million dollars. Over 10 years, the total amount repaid will come to 127.5 million dollars. The repayment of the capital is not usually made in equal instalments. In the initial years, the repayment concerns mainly the interest, and the proportion of capital repaid increases over the years. In this case, if repayments are stopped, the capital still due is higher…
The nominal interest rate is the rate at which the loan is contracted. The real interest rate is the nominal rate reduced by the rate of inflation. of EFSF loans are calculated on the following basis: Greece pays the EFSF financing cost plus 10 basis points guarantee fee. For each loan disbursement, there is an additional loan disbursement fee of 50 basis points. The country finances EFSF activities, bearing all of its costs, even if for whatever reason the disbursement of the Pre-Funding Operations does not take place. This scheme has imposed significant costs for Greece |17| and the amount paid as ‘service fee’ between 2012 and 2014 totaled €740 million. |18| PSI-related debts, for a time, incurred interest, but since 2014 all EFSF interest payments are deferred until 2023.
• Only a small share Share A unit of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset, representing one part of the total capital stock. Its owner (a shareholder) is entitled to receive an equal distribution of any profits distributed (a dividend) and to attend shareholder meetings. of the loans contributed to the government’s regular expenditure. |19| The bailout was disbursed mainly in EFSF securities: notes worth €34.6 billion subsidized the PSI, €11.3 billion notes were used in the ‘Debt buy back’ and €37.3 billion has been cur-rently borrowed for the Greek banks.
• The majority of the EFSF bailout was disbursed ‘in kind’, not in euros. Cashless operations constitute 65.4% of total EFSF loans. |20| As elaborated in Chapter 4, the EFSF facilitates an exchange of obligations, mean-ing that the loans are, on the whole, not designed to enter Greece, but rather be used directly, inter alia, for the repayment of debts.
• The European Parliament and the IMF acknowledge that the IMF programme results were “uneven” and contained “notable failures”. |21| This is a gross underestimation of the extent of the deceit towards the Greek people.
• Concrete negotiations surrounding the size and type of the loan between the IMF and Greece had be-gun from March 2010. |22| First Deputy Managing Director, Lipsky, assured the Greek representative to the IMF that the Greek loan size would be decided by the Board on a political basis, rather than calculated according to the quota allowance. |23| The Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) loan was concluded at a record breaking amount of 3,212% of Greece’s quota. |24|
• The IMF knew from the outset that there was no historical precedent for such a scale of fiscal adjustment, |25| stating in March 2010 that the programme would result in “sharp contraction of demand, and an attendant deep recession, severely stretching the social fabric”. |26| As such, several members of the Board pointed to the programme’s “immense” risks. |27|
• Waivers of applicability for performance criteria were accepted by the IMF Board in seven out of the ten programme reviews |28| highlighting that ubiquitous observance of conditionality was not essential for continued provision of financing, |29| whilst also indicating intrusive and unreasonable conditions. The IMF insists on reforms despite “considerable social unrest” and “popular dissatisfaction with reforms”. |30|
The systematic bias and lack of transparency in the IMF’s methodology for forecasting is evidenced by the IMF’s Internal Evaluation Office, particularly in high profile cases and lending under exceptional access. |31| The original Debt Sustainability Analysis was positively skewed to the upside, utilising grossly unrealistic assumptions discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. IMF staff could not sign off that Greek debt was sustainable in the medium term to a high probability and as such did not qualify for exceptional access under the second criterion on debt sustainability so the Board neces-sitated an amendment to its policy during the same Board meeting that approved Greece’s SBA, |32| a fact resented by several Eds. |33|
Despite overt admission that mid-term debt sustainability is lacking, programme approval rested on excessively onerous repayment burdens. |34| Over the past five years (May 2010 to 2015) over €3 billion has been paid in interest and charges. |35| The interest rate for the second programme is the basic rate of charge (currently SDR interest rate plus 100 basis points), plus a surcharge of 200 basis points on credit outstanding above 300% of the quota. This rises to 300 basis points when the amount outstanding three years after the programme began is over 300% of quota, and includes a 50 basis points service charge for each amount drawn. As of end 2014 €23.9 billion is recorded as an out-standing debt to the IMF |36| ; this is recorded as a promissory note issued by the Greek government, and kept at the Bank of Greece which acts as a fiscal agent for the Hellenic Republic vis-a-vis the IMF.
Summary of IMF Disbursements
and Payments (Billions of Euros), end 2014
• The ECB bought Greek bonds in the secondary market
The market where institutional investors resell and purchase financial assets. Thus the secondary market is the market where already existing financial assets are traded.
In May 2010 the ECB established the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Under the terms of this Decision, from May 2010 to September 2012, the ECB bought over €210 billion of public bonds issued by Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece on the secondary market. |37| The outstanding amount is €138,1 billion |38| in 29 May 2015, with €27 billion owed by Greece. |39|
• The ECB is Greece’s biggest creditor in the short and medium term
After the EFSF and the IMF, the ECB is Greece’s third largest creditor, with Greece owing €27 billion in April 2015. However, no other creditor has so many claims on Greece until the end of the decade, not even the IMF. Greece has to pay €6.7 billion to the ECB and other central banks of the European System of Central Banks in 2015 and €23 billion over the next five years.
• The ECB bought Greek debt on the secondary market in order to serve the interests of European private banks
The ECB has used this mechanism at its discretion for undemocratic purposes interfering in the political sovereignty of european member states and acting against their Constitutions between May 2010 and July 2012, when it was substituted by the Outright Monetary Policy Program. This decision served the interests of the private financial sector, allowing the French and German banks to reduce exposure on their holdings of Greek bonds. The IMF is very clear about that: “A delayed debt restructuring also provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands”. |40| Moreover, the purchase by the ECB of significant quantities of bonds on the secondary market increased the price of these financial instruments Financial instruments Financial instruments include financial securities and financial contracts. . This allowed the bond Bond A bond is a stake in a debt issued by a company or governmental body. The holder of the bond, the creditor, is entitled to interest and reimbursement of the principal. If the company is listed, the holder can also sell the bond on a stock-exchange. -holders to reduce their losses the moment they sold them. We should also note that between May 2010 and September 2012, the ECB decided to freeze the SMP several times, which created market stress and had an influence on different political decisions, such as the increase in the EFSF lending capacity to €440 billion.
Such political influence clearly falls beyond the mandate given to the ECB and it represents a questionable breach of its function.
• The ECB bought Greek debt with conditionalities
Contrary to the statutes necessitating the ECB to act independently, the ECB’s interventions in the secondary market was predicated on political decisions regarding beneficiary member states, particularly with regard to the reduction of their public deficit. The ECB decision of 14 May 2010 creating the SMP states: “The Governing Council will decide on the scope of the interventions. The Governing Council has taken note of the statement of the euro area Member State governments that they ‘will take all measures needed to meet their fiscal targets this year and the years ahead in line with excessive deficit procedures’ and the precise additional commitments taken by some euro area Member State governments to accelerate fiscal consolidation and ensure the sustainability of their public finances. (…) As part of the Eurosystem’s single monetary policy, the outright purchase of eligible marketable debt in-struments by Eurosystem central banks under the programme should be implemented in accordance with the terms of this Decision”. |41|
On 31st May 2010, Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, stated the ECB’s response to the recent tensions in financial markets: “It is crucial that governments implement rigorously the measures needed to ensure fiscal sustainability. It is in the context of these commitments only that we have embarked on an intervention programme in the securities markets. (…) The Securities Market Programme is an extraordinary action, which was undertaken in the situation of severe tensions in financial markets. I would like to stress that the rigorous application of the adjustment programmes by governments is essential to guarantee the progressive return to a more normal functioning of financial markets”. |42|
• The ECB profits from Greek debt
The ECB purchased Greek bonds under the SMP cheaper than their nominal value on the secondary market but asked for full reimbursement (nominal value and interest payment). One estimation |43| cites that the ECB spent €40 billion to acquire the estimated face value of €55 billion, which if held to maturity, the ECB would reap the full difference between the price paid and the repayment plus interest. The ECB has already received hefty interest from Greece, as the rates on the Greek bonds it holds are high.
Although the ECB holds far less Greek debt than it does from Italy or Spain, Greece pays much more in-terest to the ECB. Over the course of 2014, the Greek Government paid €298 in interest on ECB loans, which represents 40% percent of the €728 million income that the ECB received from the total interest paid by the five countries in the SMP program. This is despite the fact that the Greek debt with the ECB represents only 12% of the total. |44|
Debt due to the ECB by countries under the SMP (February 2015) |45|
After the public revelation that the ECB and the Na-tional Central Banks (NCBs) made profits on the SMP program, the Euro-area governments agreed in November 2012 to transfer an amount equal to any profit Profit The positive gain yielded from a company’s activity. Net profit is profit after tax. Distributable profit is the part of the net profit which can be distributed to the shareholders. on SMP holdings of the country’s debt as long as it complies with the conditions of its surveillance program. |46| The ECB owes Greece almost €2 billion from the profits the ECB has made. |47| Mario Draghi said “the income generated by Greek government bonds acquired by the ECB under the SMP is part of the ECB’s net profit. The ECB’s net profit is distributed to all NCBs of the euro area according to their shares in the ECB capital key, including the NCBs of the countries that are subject to an EU-IMF financial assistance programme (…) not only the ECB but also all the euro area NCBs have purchased bonds under the SMP in the past, which means that income on Greek government bonds has been accrued by both the ECB and the NCBs. Furthermore, I would like to stress that (i) the euro area NCBs cannot distribute specific (“earmarked”) income to their shareholders before having calculated the overall profit (or loss) in a financial year; and (ii) they can only distribute their profits to their shareholders (including the respective governments), and not directly to a Member State that is not a shareholder”. |48|
• The ECB did not participate in the debt restructuring of 2012
In February 2012 the restructuring of Greek debt involved a reduction of 53.5% of Greek sovereign securities held by private creditors. However the ECB refused to participate in the debt restructuring, whether through canceling part of the debt stock Debt stock The total amount of debt , postponing its maturity or reducing the interest rates. This was justified under the premise of “independence from any government”. |49|
5. Private creditors
“The protection of bondholders was seen as an EU necessity in the interests of financial stability” |50| ; The Budgets Committee in the European Parliament acknowledges “we have in fact transferred the wild card from private banks to governments.” |51|
• Domestic financial sector
Despite the widely held affirmations that the Greek financial sector was solvent, the problems in the Greek financial sector were significant. Mission chief Poul Thomsen underscored that “financial sector stress” in the Greek economy is a key problem that determined market access loss for the sovereign. |52|
TABLE 3.6 |53|
State Aid to the Financial Sector, billion euro
• Foreign banks
The strictly confidential document detailing the IMF Board meeting of Greece’s SBA mentions that “Dutch, French and German chairs conveyed to the Board the commitments of their commercial banks to support Greece and broadly maintain their exposures”. |54| Instead, the foreign banks disrespected their commitment, and as detailed in Chapter 4 of this report, the bailout mechanisms facilitated the transfer of debt ownership from private banks to the official sector. The European Parliament reaffirms that the bailouts shielded the “banking sector from losses by transferring large amounts of programme country sovereign debt Sovereign debt Government debts or debts guaranteed by the government. from the balance Balance End of year statement of a company’s assets (what the company possesses) and liabilities (what it owes). In other words, the assets provide information about how the funds collected by the company have been used; and the liabilities, about the origins of those funds. -sheet of the private sector to that of the public sector”. |55|
• PSI Holdouts
Out of the eligible €205.5 billion, the final participation was €199.2 billion. The Troika’s bailout loans, far from being utilized to help pay for wages and pensions are instead used to reward the holdouts, many of which are known vulture funds Vulture funds
Vulture fund Investment funds who buy, on the secondary markets and at a significant discount, bonds once emitted by countries that are having repayment difficulties, from investors who prefer to cut their losses and take what price they can get in order to unload the risk from their books. The Vulture Funds then pursue the issuing country for the full amount of the debt they have purchased, not hesitating to seek decisions before, usually, British or US courts where the law is favourable to creditors. , by repaying them in full. |56| From May 15, 2012 until the end 2015, €3.615 billion has been repaid at an average of 4.3% interest.
Chapter 1 : Debt before the Troika
Chapter 2 : Evolution of the Greek public debt during 2010-2015
Chapter 4 : Debt mechanism in Greece
Chapter 5 : The conditionnalities against sustainability
Chapter 6 : The impact of the “bailout” programme on human rights
Chapter 7 : Legal issues surrounding the MoU and Loan Agreements
Chapter 8 : Assessment of the debt as regards illegitimacy, odiousness, illegality and unsustainability
Chapter 9 : Legal foundations for repudiation and suspension of Greek sovereign debt
Preliminary Report of the Truth Committee on Public Debt in PDF
|1| EFSF, 2015. European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Available at: http://goo.gl/6487cS [Accessed June 12, 2015]; IMF, 2014. GREECE FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND FACILITY, IMF Country Report No. 14/151. Available at: https://goo.gl/jhUCjr [Accessed October 16, 2014]; IMF, 2013. Greece: First and Second Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, IMF Country Report No. 13/20. Available at: https://goo.gl/haP8Nz [Accessed June 12, 2015]; IMF, 2013. Greece: Fourth Review Under the Ex-tended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, IMF Country Report No. 13/241. Available at: http://goo.gl/euxjQD [Accessed June 13, 2015]. Use of official funding, 2010 to 2015
|2| Public Debt Management Agency, 2015. Response to request No. 160/30-4-2015, May 11 2015, Athens, Greece
|9| As agreed in the Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment of June 2011) Act 2011. p.29; Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment of February 2012) Act 2012, p7 and Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment of December 2012) Act 2013, p.8
|14| European Commission, 2011. Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment of June 2011) Act 2011.
|17| European Commission, 2012. Authorization for Pre-Funding and Indemnity Agreement.
|21| European Parliament, 2014. Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries - A7- 0149/2014. Available at: http://goo.gl/knvBol [Accessed June 12, 2015]; IMF, 2013. Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 13/156. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13156.pdf [Accessed June 12, 2015]. This document conceded “notable failures” in its first Greek bailout.
|22| Criminal case file transmitted to the Hellenic Parliament by economic crime prosecutors (September - November 2012) concerning statements of former Greek represent-ative to the IMF, P Roumeliotis: Email from Roumeliotis to the Ministry of Finance, dated 15th March 2010.
|25| Roumeliotis, P., 2012. The Unknown Background of the recourse to the IMF, Livanis, Athens.
|26| Criminal case file transmitted to the Hellenic Parliament by economic crime prosecutors (September - November 2012) concerning statements of former Greek representative to the IMF, P Roumeliotis: Secret IMF file, appears to be prepared by IMF representative to Greece, Bob Traa, Greece note for EU EDs, Dated March 25 2010.
|27| Criminal case file transmitted to the Hellenic Parliament by economic crime prosecutors (September - November 2012) concerning statements of former Greek rep-resentative to the IMF, P Roumeliotis: IMF, Board Meeting on Greece’s request or an SBA – May 9, 2010, May 10 2010, Washington DC.
|28| IMF, 2011. Greece: Fourth Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 11/175. Available at: http://goo.gl/l3GTzJ [Accessed June 12, 2015]. IMF, 2010. Greece: First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 10/286. Available at: https://goo.gl/HAZ-pB7 [Accessed June 13, 2015]. IMF, 2013. Greece: First and Second Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, IMF Country Report No. 13/20. Avail-able at: https://goo.gl/haP8Nz [Accessed June 12, 2015]; IMF, 2013. Greece: Third Review Under the Extended Arrange-ment Under the Extended Fund Facility, IMF Country Report No. 13/153. Available at: https://goo.gl/qIFPdu [Accessed June 12, 2015]; IMF, 2013. Greece: Fourth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, IMF Country Report No. 13/241. Available at: http://goo.gl/euxjQD [Accessed June 13, 2015]; IMF, 2014. Greece fifth review under the extented arrangement under the extended fund facility, IMF Country Report No. 14/151. Available at: https://goo.gl/jhUCjr [Accessed October 16, 2014].
|33| Criminal case file transmitted to the Hellenic Parlia-ment by economic crime prosecutors (September - November 2012) concerning statements of former Greek representative to the IMF, P Roumeliotis: IMF, Board Meeting on Greece’s re-quest or an SBA – May 9, 2010, May 10 2010, Washington DC.
|36| Bank of Greece, Annual Report, various years; Debts to the IMF are maintained by an off-balance sheet item, covering the total amount of the loan outstanding to the IMF in December of each year.
|37| Decision of the European Central Bank (14 May 2010) establishing a securities markets programme.
|39| Although the ECB has recorded €18.1 billion in the books, the amount at amortized cost, it asks for €19.8 billion in nominal value. The remaining € 7 billion are registered in the other central banks, which are part of the ESCB (Europe-an System of Central Banks).
|47| “This is money we are owed. This is our money, an overpayment to the ECB”, said the Minister Varoufakis. Bloomberg, Varoufakis Counts on ECB to Avoid Greek Default in March. Bloomberg. Available at: http://goo.gl/zQ7hhH [Accessed June 12, 2015].
|49| Official Journal of the European Union, 2012. PROTO-COL (No 4) ON THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS AND OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK. Available at: https://goo.gl/tfb3od [Accessed June 12, 2015].
|50| European Parliament, 2014. Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries - A7-0149/2014. Available at: http://goo.gl/knvBol [Accessed June 12, 2015].
|52| Criminal case file transmitted to the Hellenic Parliament by economic crime prosecutors (September - November 2012) concerning statements of former Greek representative to the IMF, P Roumeliotis: IMF, Strictly Confidential May 2 2010 Informal Restricted Briefing on Greece, Office Memorandum.
|54| Criminal case file transmitted to the Hellenic Parliament by economic crime prosecutors (September - November 2012) concerning statements of former Greek representative to the IMF, P Roumeliotis:, Strictly Confidential, May 2 2010, Informal restricted.
|55| European Parliament, 2014. Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries - A7- 0149/2014. Available at: http://goo.gl/knvBol [Accessed June 12, 2015].p. 6
|56| Laskaridis, C., 2014. Greece: Europe’s worst success story. In T. Philips, ed. Europe on the Brink. London: Zed Books.
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