4 January by Milford Bateman
Carlos ZGZ / Flickr cc
This is part of a series of articles The Conversation Africa is running on financial inclusion and micro credit and their role in economic development.
Post-apartheid South Africa provides ample evidence of the debilitating trajectory of the microcredit movement. The expansion of microcredit and the informal microenterprise sector was one of the policy responses of the first democratically elected government.
This was how it was going to deal with the legacy of poverty and high unemployment in the black community. But evidence shows that microcredit didn’t create large numbers of sustainable jobs. Nor did it raise incomes in the poorest communities. Instead, the deployment of microcredit precipitated a major disaster.
South Africa saw a dramatic fall in average incomes in the informal economy - around 11% per year in real terms - from 1997-2003. This was brought about by two things:
a modest rise in the number of micro enterprises in townships and rural areas driven by greater availability of micro credit, along with
little additional demand due to the austerity policies of the government.
What then happened was that the self-employment jobs created by the expansion of the informal sector were offset by the fall in average informal sector incomes. Increased competition softened prices and reduced turnover in each microenterprise as existing demand was simply shared out more widely. Poverty inevitably spiked.
The microcredit movement thus helped plunge large numbers of black South African’s into deeper over-indebtedness, poverty and insecurity. At the same time, not coincidentally, a tiny white elite became extremely rich by supplying large amounts of microcredit to black South Africans.
Not surprisingly, many in South Africa say that microcredit brought about the country’s own sub-prime-style financial crisis. It had its own local flavour, generating even more disturbing race-based exploitation overtones than even in the US.
In Latin America for over two decades an increasing number of microcredit institutions and some commercial banks have massively expanded the supply of microcredit. Surely, as arch-neoliberal Hernando de Soto long promised, there should be evidence of a “bottom-up” microenterprise-driven miracle?
Well, there isn’t.
Instead there is growing evidence that micro credit has helped destroy Latin America’s economic base. This happened because scarce financial resources - savings and remittances - were channelled into unproductive informal micro-enterprises and self-employment ventures, as well as consumer loans. Communities were thus “dumbed down” not “scaled-up” to become more productive and growth-oriented.
This negative assessment was also reached by the mainstream Inter-American Development Bank.
It bravely reported that the proliferation of microenterprises and self-employment ventures was the principle cause of deeper poverty, inequality and economic weakness between 1980 and 2000. Its conclusion was quite damning:
More fundamental problems
A more fundamental problem with microcredit is related to its presumed role in securing a long-term “bottom-up” development trajectory. Africa is most often given as the obvious example of a region held back by a shortage of entrepreneurs.
The international development community, aided by high-profile African economists like Dambisa Moyo, continually stress this point. They argue that microcredit is desperately needed to create an African entrepreneurial class. This, it is argued, will serve as the vanguard of job creation and sustainable development.
But development economist Ha-Joon Chang points out that this argument is entirely bogus. He argues that Africa already has more individual entrepreneurs than perhaps any other continent. Many more are being created thanks to rafts of new microcredit programs initiated by commercial banks.
Yet it is because of this trajectory that Africa largely remains trapped in poverty and under development.
There are three main reasons why the expansion of microcredit has helped preclude the emergence of a growth-oriented local economic structure in Africa.
First, the arrival of microcredit induced the over supply of tiny “buy cheap, sell dear” trading
trading Buying and selling of financial instruments such as shares, futures, derivatives, options, and warrants conducted in the hope of making a short-term profit. operations. This, predictably, led to:
Second, the financial sector in Africa has switched into supporting the much more profitable microcredit sector. Informal microenterprises and consumption spending get support. Formal small and medium businesses don’t. They are much riskier and can only pay low interest rates
When A lends money to B, B repays the amount lent by A (the capital) as well as a supplementary sum known as interest, so that A has an interest in agreeing to this financial operation. The interest is determined by the interest rate, which may be high or low. To take a very simple example: if A borrows 100 million dollars for 10 years at a fixed interest rate of 5%, the first year he will repay a tenth of the capital initially borrowed (10 million dollars) plus 5% of the capital owed, i.e. 5 million dollars, that is a total of 15 million dollars. In the second year, he will again repay 10% of the capital borrowed, but the 5% now only applies to the remaining 90 million dollars still due, i.e. 4.5 million dollars, or a total of 14.5 million dollars. And so on, until the tenth year when he will repay the last 10 million dollars, plus 5% of that remaining 10 million dollars, i.e. 0.5 million dollars, giving a total of 10.5 million dollars. Over 10 years, the total amount repaid will come to 127.5 million dollars. The repayment of the capital is not usually made in equal instalments. In the initial years, the repayment concerns mainly the interest, and the proportion of capital repaid increases over the years. In this case, if repayments are stopped, the capital still due is higher…
The nominal interest rate is the rate at which the loan is contracted. The real interest rate is the nominal rate reduced by the rate of inflation. . But they are much more important in reducing poverty and underpinning longer term development.
So we find a perverse situation. The more productive formal small and medium business sector is starved of financial support. Meanwhile the hugely unproductive informal microenterprise sector is being stuffed full of microcredit.
Third, the market share Share A unit of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset, representing one part of the total capital stock. Its owner (a shareholder) is entitled to receive an equal distribution of any profits distributed (a dividend) and to attend shareholder meetings. grabbed by rafts of largely “here today and gone tomorrow” informal microenterprises has militated against patient capital accumulation and organic growth by better placed formal enterprises.
A fundamental block on growth
The core problem everywhere in developing countries is quite simple: the microcredit model actually works as a fundamental block on sustainable development and growth at the local level.
The economic history of developed countries and the East Asian “tiger” economies shows one thing very clearly. The key to sustainable growth and development is the financial system’s ability to intermediate scarce financial resources into growth-oriented enterprises. These are enterprises that:
The microcredit model actually sends developing countries off in completely the wrong direction. It does this by absorbing the financial resources, time, effort and policy attention which should have gone into supporting the most productive enterprises.
The microcredit sector today is like a rapidly growing weed that absorbs the sunlight and nutrients required by the more valuable but slower growing crops around it. The microcredit model is not one of the solutions to endemic poverty, inequality, low productivity and under development. Rather, it is one of the principle causes.
Visiting Professor of Economics, Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Croatia
28 December 2015, by Milford Bateman