Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt

 Firstly, the BRICS BRICS The term BRICS (an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) was first used in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, then an economist at Goldman Sachs. The strong economic growth of these countries, combined with their important geopolitical position (these 5 countries bring together almost half the world’s population on 4 continents and almost a quarter of the world’s GDP) make the BRICS major players in international economic and financial activities. do not present the New Development Bank and the Monetary Fund (CRA) as an alternative

The BRIC+ countries consider that the IMF IMF
International Monetary Fund Along with the World Bank, the IMF was founded on the day the Bretton Woods Agreements were signed. Its first mission was to support the new system of standard exchange rates.

When the Bretton Wood fixed rates system came to an end in 1971, the main function of the IMF became that of being both policeman and fireman for global capital: it acts as policeman when it enforces its Structural Adjustment Policies and as fireman when it steps in to help out governments in risk of defaulting on debt repayments.

As for the World Bank, a weighted voting system operates: depending on the amount paid as contribution by each member state. 85% of the votes is required to modify the IMF Charter (which means that the USA with 17,68% % of the votes has a de facto veto on any change).

The institution is dominated by five countries: the United States (16,74%), Japan (6,23%), Germany (5,81%), France (4,29%) and the UK (4,29%).
The other 183 member countries are divided into groups led by one country. The most important one (6,57% of the votes) is led by Belgium. The least important group of countries (1,55% of the votes) is led by Gabon and brings together African countries.

http://imf.org must remain at the centre of the international financial system.
In the final declaration of the BRICS+ summit held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in early July 2025, they state in point 11:

‘The IMF must remain adequately resourced and able to mobilise funds rapidly, at the heart of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), in order to effectively support its members, particularly the most vulnerable countries.’ [1]

They also express their support for the World Bank World Bank
WB The World Bank was founded as part of the new international monetary system set up at Bretton Woods in 1944. Its capital is provided by member states’ contributions and loans on the international money markets. It financed public and private projects in Third World and East European countries.

It consists of several closely associated institutions, among which :

1. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, 189 members in 2017), which provides loans in productive sectors such as farming or energy ;

2. The International Development Association (IDA, 159 members in 1997), which provides less advanced countries with long-term loans (35-40 years) at very low interest (1%) ;

3. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), which provides both loan and equity finance for business ventures in developing countries.

As Third World Debt gets worse, the World Bank (along with the IMF) tends to adopt a macro-economic perspective. For instance, it enforces adjustment policies that are intended to balance heavily indebted countries’ payments. The World Bank advises those countries that have to undergo the IMF’s therapy on such matters as how to reduce budget deficits, round up savings, enduce foreign investors to settle within their borders, or free prices and exchange rates.

. In point 12 of their declaration, they state that they wish to enhance the legitimacy of this institution. And in the final statement from the BRICS+ foreign ministers’ meeting held in mid-May 2026 in India, they state that the New Development Bank must strengthen cooperation with multilateral banks such as the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank), all of which are aligned with the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions (see paragraph 57 of ‘Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (15 May 2026)’, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41144 accessed 2 July 2026).
However, since their foundation, the World Bank and the IMF have pursued policies that run counter to the interests of peoples and ecological balance. (Confronting Financial Institutions’ Legacies in the Global South : 30 arguments against the World Bank and the IMF)

In their most recent statements, the BRICS countries have expressed no criticism of the neoliberal policies that the two Bretton Woods institutions are actively seeking to implement. At no point do they question the debts that these institutions are demanding from indebted countries.

On the role assigned by the BRICS+ to the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO WTO
World Trade Organisation The WTO, founded on 1^st January 1995, replaced the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The main innovation is that the WTO enjoys the status of an international organization. Its role is to ensure that no member States adopt any kind of protectionism whatsoever, in order to accelerate the liberalization global trading and to facilitate the strategies of the multinationals. It has an international court (the Dispute Settlement Body) which judges any alleged violations of its founding text drawn up in Marrakesh.

and free trade, see The BRICS are the new defenders of free trade, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank

 Secondly, the Monetary Fund (CRA) has not granted any loans, despite having been established in 2014

This fund, known as the CRA (Contingent Reserve Arrangement) and established in 2014 , was intended to fulfil, for the BRICS countries, the role normally played by the IMF when one of its members faces a shortage of foreign exchange reserves to make payments and turns to it for a loan. Although this fund was established on paper in 2014, it has still not become operational. To find out more about the CRA, read the previous article: Have the BRICS countries built an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF?

 Thirdly, when it comes to lending, China gives priority to its own banks

When granting loans, China favours the instruments directly at its disposal, namely its state-owned banks. Since 2015, Chinese banks have granted loans 20 to 30 times greater than those disbursed by the New Development Bank (see the table in the previous article, reproduced below).

Source: author’s calculations based on the annual reports of the institutions concerned, the IMF database, NDB reports and estimates from AidData and the Rhodium Group.

 Fourthly, China favours the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank over the New Development Bank

Alongside the BRICS’ NDB, the Chinese authorities have established another multilateral bank to which a significant number of countries have acceded. This is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has its headquarters in Beijing. The AIIB has more than 100 member countries (including 23 European countries, amongst them Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium, etc.). The United States and Japan are not members. The AIIB began operations in 2016, almost at the same time as the NDB. The AIIB’s capital stands at $100 billion, of which approximately 30 per cent has been subscribed by China, which is the main shareholder. The voting process is similar to that of the World Bank and the IMF: it is based on the share Share A unit of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset, representing one part of the total capital stock. Its owner (a shareholder) is entitled to receive an equal distribution of any profits distributed (a dividend) and to attend shareholder meetings. of capital held, which gives China a de facto veto over major decisions. In conclusion, the AIIB plays a much more significant role than the New Development Bank, both in terms of the number of member countries and the volume of loans it grants.

 Fifthly, China supports the conditions imposed by the IMF

China, which has become one of the world’s leading public lenders, insists that countries remain in good standing with both the IMF and the World Bank, and therefore requires borrowers to comply with the conditionalities set out in the loan agreements they have signed with these institutions

 Sixthly, the New Development Bank (NDB) does not lend to the poorest countries

None of the 50 sub-Saharan African countries has had access to credit from the New Development Bank, apart from South Africa

It should be noted that the only loans the NDB has granted in sub-Saharan Africa have been to South Africa. No other country south of the Sahara has had access to NDB credit. This includes Ethiopia, which is a member of BRICS+ and has not received any credit from the NDB. As for North Africa, no country has received a loan from the NDB, not even Egypt, which is a member. In Asia, only China, Bangladesh and India have received loans from the NDB. In Latin America, only Brazil has received loans from the NDB; no other country has received any. How can it be claimed that the NDB constitutes an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF when, to date, not a single one of the 25 low-income countries has received a loan from the NDB, and when, among the 50 lower-middle-income countries, only Bangladesh [2] and India [3] have had access to an NDB loan? Bangladesh has received seven loans totalling approximately 1.2 billion dollars (see https://www.ndb.int/projects/all-projects/?country=bangladesh&key_area_focus=&project_status=&type_category=&pyearval=#paginated-list accessed on 2 July 2026). As noted above, Egypt, which is one of the 50 lower-middle-income countries, is a member of the NDB and BRICS+ and has not received any loans to date. The remainder of the loans granted went to Russia (up to 2021, as lending was halted from 2022 onwards), Brazil, China and South Africa.

 Seventh, the BRICS have not created an alternative to SWIFT.

How can it be claimed that the NDB is an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF when, to date, not a single one of the 25 low-income countries has received a loan from the NDB?

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the BRICS+ have not established an international payment or financial messaging system as an alternative to SWIFT. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a ‘co-operative’ company incorporated under Belgian law which manages the world’s leading secure financial messaging network, enabling banks and other financial institutions to exchange payment instructions. More than 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and territories use this infrastructure, which has become a central component of the international financial system. Western powers have excluded most Iranian and Russian banks from SWIFT following sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies against these two BRICS member countries. In the case of Russia, Western sanctions were imposed from 2014 (following the annexation of Crimea) and then, in particular, after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 [4]. In response, Moscow developed its own national financial messaging system (SPFS), and Russian leaders, along with several BRICS officials, have regularly discussed the creation of an international payment system that would serve as an alternative or parallel to SWIFT. China, whose banks are not subject to sanctions, has set up its own system, known as CIPS, which operates alongside SWIFT.

By mid-2026, no joint BRICS system comparable to SWIFT is operational. Official statements from the BRICS are limited to supporting the development of payments in national currencies and improving the interoperability of existing systems.

 Eighthly, no common BRICS currency

The BRICS have not created a common currency and do not intend to create one in the future. The BRICS+ do not discuss de-dollarisation. Read: The BRICS and de-dollarisation

 Strategic and political summary and conclusion

It is worth noting that the five founding members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) could, if they so wished, form a powerful bloc, as they account for around 40 per cent of the world’s population, nearly a third of global GDP GDP
Gross Domestic Product Gross Domestic Product is an aggregate measure of total production within a given territory equal to the sum of the gross values added. The measure is notoriously incomplete; for example it does not take into account any activity that does not enter into a commercial exchange. The GDP takes into account both the production of goods and the production of services. Economic growth is defined as the variation of the GDP from one period to another. in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, and around 20 per cent of global exports. Including the five countries (Indonesia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates) that have become full members since 2024, BRICS+ accounts for around 45 per cent of the world’s population, nearly 35 per cent of global GDP (PPP), approximately 25 per cent of global exports and around 35 to 40 per cent of global oil production.

However, it must be noted that neither the BRICS nor the BRICS+ form a cohesive bloc; they constitute a heterogeneous alliance whose members negotiate separately with the United States. Worse still: Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), both members of the BRICS+, are in fact at war with one another. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are strategic allies of the United States and Israel, which have twice launched wars against Iran – once in June 2025 and again at the end of February 2026.

Ten years after their creation, the New Development Bank and the BRICS Monetary Fund (CRA) do not constitute a credible alternative to the Bretton Woods institutions, but rather a peripheral extension of them. Behind the rhetoric of ‘de-dollarisation’ and the financial emancipation of the Global South, these two instruments remain trapped within a logic of dependence on international financial markets and implicit submission to IMF discipline. The CRA, which has been inactive since its creation, symbolises this impasse: intended to protect BRICS members from IMF conditionalities, it instead refers them back to the IMF as soon as they exceed a certain borrowing threshold. The NDB, for its part, has become a semi-Westernised institution: its financing is predominantly denominated in dollars, its credit ratings depend on the major Anglo-Saxon agencies, and its lending strategy does not aim to provide credit to the countries that need it most and which should be supported in a human development strategy compatible with the balance Balance End of year statement of a company’s assets (what the company possesses) and liabilities (what it owes). In other words, the assets provide information about how the funds collected by the company have been used; and the liabilities, about the origins of those funds. of nature.

Beijing’s stance is indicative of this ambiguity. In practice, China favours its own state-owned banks and the AIIB to extend its influence, relegating the NDB to a secondary role. This choice reflects a hierarchy among the financial instruments Financial instruments Financial instruments include financial securities and financial contracts. of the Global South, where multilateral cooperation remains subordinate to national power dynamics.

Politically, the BRICS+ do not seek a break with the global financial order. By reaffirming the central role of the IMF and the World Bank, they have positioned themselves as reformers within the system rather than as architects of an alternative. This stance reveals the founding paradox of the BRICS+: seeking to embody the voice of the Global South without breaking with the structures of domination of the Global North and the capitalist system.

Thus, ten years after the creation of the NDB and the CRA, the promise of a post-Western financial hub remains unfulfilled, if not outright abandoned. The BRICS+, some of whose members – such as the UAE and Egypt – are direct allies of the United States, are, in the absence of a shared political will for systemic transformation, consolidating a hybrid model in which the rhetoric of sovereignty masks the persistence or reinforcement of dependencies. The genuine alternative to the Bretton Woods institutions will not emerge from a mere institutional replica, but from a collective project based on financial justice, South-South solidarity and the establishment of new, genuinely democratic multilateral financial institutions whose priority will be the fulfilment of fundamental human rights and respect for Nature.

Read: The Case for Abolishing and Replacing the IMF and the World Bank The Case for Abolishing and Replacing the IMF and the World Bank accessed on 2 July 2026

The author would like to thank Patrick Bond Bond A bond is a stake in a debt issued by a company or governmental body. The holder of the bond, the creditor, is entitled to interest and reimbursement of the principal. If the company is listed, the holder can also sell the bond on a stock-exchange. , Sushovan Dhar and Maxime Perriot for proofreading this text and for their advice.