Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt

This article shows that at several decisive moments during the first six months of the Tsipras government it was possible and necessary to apply different policies from those that were adopted. As a conclusion, it opens up to the European level and sets forward an international orientation.

Despite what the majority of analysts and political actors may believe or have believed, whether or not to leave the Eurozone was not the most urgent matter to be resolved by the Tsipras government.

In fact the programme that got Syriza elected to government did not propose leaving the Eurozone. This was made very clear by Tsipras and many other leaders of Syriza, who during the electoral campaign declared a desire to remain within the Eurozone.

 Priorities of Syriza’s electoral programme

On the other hand, there is no doubt about the following priorities outlined in the programme:

• to get most of the debt stock Debt stock The total amount of debt cancelled;
• to bring the memorandum imposed by the Troika Troika Troika: IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank, which together impose austerity measures through the conditions tied to loans to countries in difficulty.
  
  IMF : https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html to an immediate end and replace it with a programme of national reconstruction;
• to no longer accept that government and parliamentary decisions should be submitted to the Troika for approval;
• to take a series of practical measures to improve the living conditions of the population, who for the last five years had been suffering the terrible consequences of a brutal austerity treatment and social decline;
• to take over the banks, keeping in mind that four of them represented more than 90 per cent of the Greek banking sector, and that their main shareholder was the government, who instead of exercising their power left it in the hands of private shareholders who had demonstrated only greed and an inability to clean up the banks. Far from being a mere ideological commitment, taking over the banks and putting them at the service of the population and the reconstruction plan was not only a commitment Syriza had made toward the popular majority that had voted the party in; it was also a vital necessity. Indeed, the banking sector was in a deplorable state and urgently needed to be put in order. Monitoring it was an indispensable prerequisite to setting up new policies serving the interests of the population.

 What required the most urgent attention in January 2015?

There needed to be very concrete measures to improve the living conditions of the population:

• restore the legal minimum salary to its 2009 level, and the same for pensions up to a certain ceiling, to increase the purchasing power of a majority of the population;
• radically reduce the rate of VAT on products and services of basic necessity so as to lower their prices;
• launch a plan to relieve household debt to the state and banks, by deciding through legal means debt cancellations and other arrangements to help the millions of indebted households with only low or medium income;
• reduce or eliminate the weight of certain taxes such as the property tax, which had had a huge effect on the living conditions of households with low or medium income;
• restore access to electricity for the 300,000 households who had been deprived of it;
• organize free access to health services;
• make public transport free by decree for a large part of the population, if not for all citizens.

Most of these measures were part of the Syriza programme.

Moreover there was an urgent need to:

• check rapidly whether the creditors were ready to reduce the debt as asked in the Thessaloniki programme. In the very first days it became apparent that the Troika was not at all of a mind to grant any debt reduction, however minimal. From that moment, on 12 February 2015 (the date of the first payment of €747.6 million to the IMF IMF
  International Monetary Fund Along with the World Bank, the IMF was founded on the day the Bretton Woods Agreements were signed. Its first mission was to support the new system of standard exchange rates.
  
  When the Bretton Wood fixed rates system came to an end in 1971, the main function of the IMF became that of being both policeman and fireman for global capital: it acts as policeman when it enforces its Structural Adjustment Policies and as fireman when it steps in to help out governments in risk of defaulting on debt repayments.
  
  As for the World Bank, a weighted voting system operates: depending on the amount paid as contribution by each member state. 85% of the votes is required to modify the IMF Charter (which means that the USA with 17,68% % of the votes has a de facto veto on any change).
  
  The institution is dominated by five countries: the United States (16,74%), Japan (6,23%), Germany (5,81%), France (4,29%) and the UK (4,29%).
  The other 183 member countries are divided into groups led by one country. The most important one (6,57% of the votes) is led by Belgium. The least important group of countries (1,55% of the votes) is led by Gabon and brings together African countries.
  
  http://imf.org ), payments on the debt should have been suspended to avoid a haemorrhage of the state’s financial means and the procedure for an audit of the debt with citizen participation launched;
• take strong measures to restore the banks to healthy functioning and put them at the service of the population;
• bring new money into the state treasury–not to repay the debt demanded by the Troika, but on the contrary, to provide extra means to finance the plan to combat the humanitarian crisis and for economic reconstruction. That meant, for example, measures targeting the wealthiest households, the big national and foreign companies, particularly in the shipbuilding sector, and private television channels (which had paid almost no taxes for several years). It also meant fining large-scale fraudsters through a levy on their estate and/or their income in order to quickly raise large sums of money;
• bring the Memorandum to an end (in any case it was due to end on 28 February 2015) and launch the programme of national reconstruction.

 Leaving the Eurozone?

The question of leaving the Eurozone was not immediately on the agenda for the Syriza government, even though, as subsequent events showed, it rapidly became a central topic that needed to be responded to. As early as 20 February 2015, Varoufakis–as finance minister and with the consent of Alexis Tsipras’s inner circle–signed a document with the Eurogroup that led him to give up the idea of making good on the commitments listed above. When he signed the 20 February agreement, Varoufakis

• committed to repaying the debt on the dates scheduled, even though the Troika would not promise to pay any funds and refused to pay the amounts Greece was owed;
• abandoned his commitment to enact the end of the Memorandum immediately; on the contrary, he agreed to an extension of four months;
• took no measures regarding banks, whereas restructuring them should have been one of the main priorities;
• kept up a submissive attitude towards the Troika, which ht re-named “the institutions.”

Concrete measures to improve the living conditions of most of the population were timid and constantly questioned by the Troika.

The agreement of 20 February met with enormous criticism within Syriza’s parliamentary group and within the government. The president of parliament, a member of Syriza, refused to put it to the vote since she opposed this first capitulation.

 What should have been done?

What should have been done? The answer is simple: electoral promises should have been kept–it was a democratic and a moral obligation and the only way to succeed.

Not that the Thessaloniki programme was perfect. But it was on that basis that Syriza had won a mandate, and despite its weaknesses it would have significantly improved the lot of the population. The priorities of the programme had to be respected, and they could have been, had the government begun implementing its main points.

The government that emerged from the elections of 25 January 2015 had all the legitimacy required to take precautionary measures to ensure that its commitments would be kept. Its duty was to face up to the aggressiveness that the Troika showed as soon as the government was in place.

Three specific examples will illustrate how the Troika failed to fulfil its obligations and how it violated the mandate the Greeks had given their government even though it had made no move to break away from EU constraints:

1. 1. From 4 February 2015, when the government had only existed for seven days and had taken no measures with any budgetary impact, the ECB ECB
   European Central Bank The European Central Bank is a European institution based in Frankfurt, founded in 1998, to which the countries of the Eurozone have transferred their monetary powers. Its official role is to ensure price stability by combating inflation within that Zone. Its three decision-making organs (the Executive Board, the Governing Council and the General Council) are composed of governors of the central banks of the member states and/or recognized specialists. According to its statutes, it is politically ‘independent’ but it is directly influenced by the world of finance.
   
   https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html blocked the Greek banks’ access to the existing mechanism for obtaining liquidities Liquidities The capital an economy or company has available at a given point in time. A lack of liquidities can force a company into liquidation and an economy into recession. . The decision substantially reduced the government’s ability to get funds and triggered a rush of withdrawals by depositors.
2. The ECB, with the support of the Eurozone governments, refused to keep its commitment to repay, in 2015, a sum of approximately €1.9 billion in profits made on Greek bonds held by the central banks of the Eurosystem and by the ECB.
3. The Troika repatriated the remainder of the banks’ capitalization fund, €11 billion, to Luxembourg when that fund should have been placed at the disposal of the Greek government for restructuring the banking sector.

Instead of allowing Varoufakis to sign the 20 February agreement, the Greek government should have reacted more or less as follows:

“In view of the lack of cooperation from the creditors, we are taking the precautionary measure of suspending the debt repayments demanded by the Troika for long enough to carry out an audit with citizen participation. The audit will enable us to determine which parts of the debt claimed from Greece are legitimate and illegitimate. Once the audit has been completed over a reasonable period of four months, we will see where we stand.

“Furthermore the obligation to carry out an audit is laid down in a European regulation adopted in May 2013. The unpaid money will not remain unused but will finance the revival of economic activity, in particular by increasing socially justified consumption, both public and private.

“As announced in our programme, the government will assume its rights and obligations as the main shareholder of the country’s four largest banks. The idea is to restructure the banks and to put them at the service of the majority of the population.

We call upon the peoples of Europe to show their support for the people of Greece, who have mandated us to break with the damaging policies dictated by the Troika. If we win, all the peoples of Europe will share Share A unit of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset, representing one part of the total capital stock. Its owner (a shareholder) is entitled to receive an equal distribution of any profits distributed (a dividend) and to attend shareholder meetings. in the victory over austerity, proof that another way is possible.”

Other complementary measures should also have been taken, such as replacing the governor of the central bank Central Bank The establishment which in a given State is in charge of issuing bank notes and controlling the volume of currency and credit. In France, it is the Banque de France which assumes this role under the auspices of the European Central Bank (see ECB) while in the UK it is the Bank of England.

ECB : http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/Pages/home.aspx of Greece, a declared enemy of the government’s programme and a figure of the old system; [1] instituting control of capital flows to prevent capital flight and economic sabotage; setting up a system of parallel payment that would complement the system of payment in euros; rapidly presenting parliament with a series of laws and measures leading to improvement of living conditions for the population and an increase in revenue collected from the richest sectors of society and large foreign companies.

If the government had taken these measures, as it legitimately could have done, it would have attracted the support of the Greek people and of a large and growing number of the peoples of Europe, but it would aroused the Troika’s anger.

What reprisals would the Troika have been able to take?

Blocking banks’ access to liquidities?
They had already begun using that measure since 4 February, and it would have been difficult for them to take it any farther immediately.

Refusing to pay out the money promised to Greece?
They had already done this: the Troika had informed the government that they would not grant any new money and that they were sending the €11 billion to which the Greek government was entitled back to Luxembourg.

Impose controls of capital flows as was done in Cyprus
The government, by deciding of its own accord to control capital flows, would have pulled the rug out from under the Troika.

Could the Greek government have gone back on its signature of the 20 February 2015 agreement in the weeks that followed?

Yes. That agreement had not been presented to the Greek parliament. It had only been signed by the finance minister and sent to the Eurogroup, which is an unofficial body. The prime minister, after a month of implementation of the agreement with the Eurogroup, could have declared it a failure and explained it to the public. It would have been best to do that at the end of March 2015 or early April, at which date very large sums were due to be paid to the IMF.

Tsipras could have explained to the Greek people and to international public opinion that the creditors had not abandoned the Troika’s methods and that in fact the Troika was still functioning. He could have explained that the government had made a series of proposals to the European bodies, which had rejected them without giving them any serious consideration. He could have made public the methods of pressure and blackmail practised by the Troika.

He could have said that despite the Greek government’s good will, it had been up against a wall right from the start. He could have told how, to persuade the Greek government to sign the 20 February agreement, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, had dangled hopes of aid to the tune of €35 billion which had come to nothing; that the ECB had let it be understood that it would lift the restriction imposed on 4 February but had not done so. He could have added that the promise made in 2013 to hand back, in 2015, €1.9 billion’s worth of profits from the ECB and the Eurosystem had not been kept. This was just as serious as sending €11 billion which should have been used to restructure the Greek banks back to Luxembourg.

In consequence of all this, Tsipras would have been entitled to declare that the Greek government had come to consider the 20 February agreement null and void. Tsipras could also have reshuffled his cabinet to show his determination to implement the most urgent measures of his programme as soon as possible.
Above all, Tsipras could have announced that his government was going to implement the series of strong measures listed above (suspension of debt payments and a debt audit with citizen participation; restructuring the banks; replacing the governor of the Bank of Greece; controlling capital flows; setting up a complementary payment system; etc.)

He could have asked for international cooperation in combating large-scale tax evaders and fraudsters. Meanwhile, he could have taken strong action against those that were already identified. He could have led a campaign on the theme “Who owes who?” with pointed reference to the debts and reparations that Germany owes the Greeks in compensation for its invasion and occupation of Greece during World War Two.
These new policies inspired by the electoral programme could have been adopted by the Tsipras government. They would have needed to be accompanied by a campaign to inform and explain using all possible channels, both inside the country and abroad. To fuel that campaign, a whole series of documents that have either remained secret or hardly been mentioned in the media could have been made public: There are the secret IMF documents, notes taken during the Eurogroup meetings, the scandal of the ECB buying up Greek bonds in 2011–2012, the role of the first Memorandum in bailing out private banks mainly in France, Germany and Benelux, the list of large-scale tax evaders, the scandals involving arms sales to Greece by German, French and US firms, and more.

 Mobilize people against the blackmail and dictates of the Troika

Such a campaign would have provided arguments that would have helped to mobilize people against the blackmail and dictates of the Troika and the governments of the major Eurozone countries. Mass mobilizations in France against the attitudes of the Hollande–Valls government, in Germany against that of Angela Merkel’s government and in Brussels and Frankfurt outside the European Commission and the ECB could have improved the balance Balance End of year statement of a company’s assets (what the company possesses) and liabilities (what it owes). In other words, the assets provide information about how the funds collected by the company have been used; and the liabilities, about the origins of those funds. of power in favour of the Greek people and their government. In Greece itself, the government and the Syriza party should have encouraged popular mobilization to legitimate the unilateral acts of severance from the creditors and force the saboteurs of the economy, and more generally the pro-austerity camp, to back off. In other words, it should have confronted the Greek capitalist class.

In pursuit of these objectives, the government should not have restricted itself to exercising state power in corridors and salons. Such an attitude could only foster the illusion that the crisis was being resolved “from the top” and demobilize the population. Instead of that, it should have made known its wish to delegate spokespersons (through the Syriza party if necessary) to establish a permanent dialogue with trade unions, associative and political organizations ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Greek people to put an end to austerity and advance towards policies of emancipation [2].

During the first semester of 2015, several opportunities came up to take a turn towards a more beneficial outcome.

Improve the living conditions of the people
Had the above-mentioned measures been implemented, the living conditions of the sectors of the population worst hit by the austerity policies and the crisis would have improved. Injecting buying power and means of payment into the real economy would have boosted economic activity. Consumption would have increased, as would production by local farmers and small and medium sized companies. That in turn would have generated employment opportunities. The money saved by suspending debt payments would have given the government the means to launch a plan to create jobs in sectors and activities that help meet social needs and usher in the ecological transition.

At every crucial stage, there was an alternative option

At the end of May 2015, when the Troika made new demands, it would still have been possible to use the fact of the increasingly aggressive stance of the European leaders to bring about the U-turn just described.

And of course, with the substantial endorsement he received with the referendum results of 5 July and the refusal of the European leaders to take any notice of that, Tsipras could still have put into place the above mentioned measures and even made them more radical, based on the results of the debt audit presented to the Hellenic parliament on 17 and 18 June 2015 and, once again, on the growing aggressiveness of the European leaders [3]. That meant unilateral and sovereign measures regarding the debt demanded by the Troika, starting with the Greek bonds held by the ECB since 2010–2012, as they fell under Greek jurisdiction. That would have enabled the government to avoid paying out €6.6 billion as they did between 20 July and 20 August 2015. Repayments to the IMF should also have been suspended for an indeterminate period, which would have saved the almost €5.5 billion that were paid out between July and the end of 2015.

During the first semester of 2015, much time was lost. Greece had made numerous payouts, in particular repaying the IMF €3.5 billion in illegitimate debt, since the Syriza government had been in power. Bank deposits had been reduced by almost €30 billion. Tens of billions of euros had left the country because of the aggressive stance of the Troika and the Tsipras government’s inability to make the right decisions of self-defence. But it would still have been possible to implement alternative policies while this time turning towards the right direction. The dazzling victory of the “no” vote in the referendum, when the Greek people were ready to confront the Troika, empowered such a choice.

While they had that option, Tsipras and his inner circle preferred to toss aside the solemn commitments that they had made to the citizens of Greece when they had announced the referendum of 5 July. It should be emphasized that Tsipras solemnly promised to respect the people’s verdict, whichever it should be.
 [4].

Tsipras and his inner circle finally chose to betray the 61.3 per cent of Greeks who had given them their trust by voting “no” on 5 July. The Tsipras government paid nearly €2 billion to the IMF on 20 July 2015, and about €6.6 billion to the ECB between 20 July and 20 August 2015 [5].

The only argument that Tsipras could come up with to explain to the people why he signed the capitulation agreement on 13 July and carried on repaying the debt was that if he had not done so, the Greek banks would have failed. That was a pitiful excuse. On the one hand, if the banks’ situation had grown even worse since January 2015, it was precisely because the Tsipras government, by giving in to pressure from the Troika, had not respected the commitment it had made to the voters. That commitment was to make proper use of their authority over the banks, to attack the oligarchy that controlled them, to restructure them and put them at the service of society. On the other hand, in July 2015, it was still possible for the state, as principal shareholder in the banks, to take control and restructure them.

Furthermore, with the third Memorandum, which Tsipras got parliament to adopt in July–August 2015, he allowed the government to lose a great deal of its weight as shareholder to the benefit of foreign investors, who in any case did nothing to restructure the Greek banks. In 2019, those banks are still teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. Greece’s banks were never seriously restructured and have remained in the hands of an oligarchy of both Greek and foreign private shareholders, including hedge funds Hedge funds Unlisted investment funds that exist for purposes of speculation and that seek high returns, make liberal use of derivatives, especially options, and frequently make use of leverage. The main hedge funds are independent of banks, although banks frequently have their own hedge funds. Hedge funds come under the category of shadow banking. . In addition, employment in the banking sector fell by 40 per cent between 2008 and 2018. Greece’s banks have recently announced that they were going to cut jobs by a further 10 per cent in the year 2019 alone–that is, 4,000 fewer jobs, 2,500 of which will take the form of forced redundancies [6]. In 2019, 45 per cent of loans granted by Greek banks were in default and had been for at least three months, the highest rate by far in the entire European Union. The total amount of loans in default of payment amounts to half Greece’s GDP GDP
Gross Domestic Product Gross Domestic Product is an aggregate measure of total production within a given territory equal to the sum of the gross values added. The measure is notoriously incomplete; for example it does not take into account any activity that does not enter into a commercial exchange. The GDP takes into account both the production of goods and the production of services. Economic growth is defined as the variation of the GDP from one period to another.  [7].

Let us not forget that the €15 billion in new public debt generated under the third Memorandum was intended to bail out private bankers.

In reality, a major strategic choice of the Syriza government–one which led to its downfall–was constantly to avoid confrontation with the Greek capitalist class. It was not simply that Syriza and the government did not seek popular mobilization against the Greek bourgeoisie, who widely adhered to the EU’s neoliberal policies. The government openly pursued policies of conciliation with them. The government did not seek to reduce the power of pro-capitalist national institutions or to promote new popular democratic institutions that would challenge the power of the dominant class. It was Syriza that had the conservative Prokopis Pavlopoulos elected president of the republic in February 2015. The government did not reform the police to clean up an institution with a strong far-right contingent, as represented by the Neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn, involved in criminal activities. The Tsipras government and Syriza did not push for the creation of popular defence committees to deal with interference from the Troika; nor did the government back the president of parliament’s efforts to make the debates and the results of the Greek debt audit committee more widely known. Yet that would have allowed the population to enjoy democratic oversight of the state’s finances.

In the end, Alexis Tsipras’s government was incapable of acknowledging that what was playing out in Greece was a brutal class conflict in which the Greek capitalist class enjoyed the support of the EU institutions with their neoliberal, and thus non democratic and unequal, structures. Rather than seeking to placate the Greek capitalists, the EU institutions and the Eurozone, they should have acknowledged the overwhelming incompatibility between, on the one hand, the interests of Greek and European capital and on the other, those of the majority of Greek society that had brought Syriza to government. The Tsipras government should have acted accordingly. They should have resolutely followed the path of disregarding the European treaties and refusing to submit to the dictates of the creditors. At the same time they should have taken the offensive against the Greek capitalists, making them pay taxes and fines, especially in the sectors of shipping, finance, the media and mass retail. It was also important to make the Orthodox Church, the country’s main land owner, pay taxes. As a means of reinforcing these policies, the government should have encouraged the development of self-organization processes in existing collective projects in various domains (for example, self-managed health dispensaries to deal with the social and humanitarian crisis or associations working to feed the most vulnerable people). There was a need to initiate a proper constituent process whereby citizens could collectively list their grievances and propose radical changes to the Greek political system and society. A constituent assembly elected by popular vote could have debated these and adopted a draft constitution to be presented to the people by referendum.

Obviously, if Tsipras had set in motion his programme of measures as mentioned above, the European authorities would have pushed Greece towards the exit of the Eurozone. They had indeed previously threatened to expel Greece for far less [8]. It is equally obvious that the Greek government, faced with the aggressive actions of the European bodies, had to be prepared to leave the Eurozone and return to a sovereign currency. Technically, establishing a new currency and putting it into circulation was far from being as complicated as some made out. It would have been possible to use euro notes stamped to differentiate them from euros. €16 billion worth of unused euro notes were available in the coffers of the Bank of Greece and its regional branches. (Interestingly, all ten-euro notes were printed in Greece in 2015.) If the government had resolutely taken such action, it would have had the support of the Greek people and could have mustered solid international solidarity.

During the referendum campaign, the majority of Greek media claimed that Greece would be expelled from the Eurozone if the “no” vote were to win. The Greek parties that were calling for the “yes” vote constantly reiterated this. A number of European leaders, including the German finance minister Wolfgang Schaüble, Benoît Cœuré of the ECB’s executive board, several heads of state and several finance ministers of the Eurozone (for example Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Netherlands) declared it loud and clear. So clearly the 61.3 per cent of voters who voted “no” knew that their vote implied that possibility even if they were not mad about the idea. For some, the reason they did not wish to leave the Eurozone was that the Tsipras government, in whom they had placed their trust, told them that leaving would mean disastrous consequences. It is quite probable that had Tsipras said: “We would like to stay in the Eurozone, but not at all costs” and gone on to explain that leaving would not be a catastrophe but presented manifest advantages, more Greeks would have understood that leaving was a viable option. Tsipras could also have asked for the application of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, as did the United Kingdom in 2017. What does Article 50 say?

1. 1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. …
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

The advantage of triggering Article 50 is that for two years, the country concerned has the right to prepare its exit without the European authorities being able to impose sanctions against that country. In any case, there is very little leeway for the European authorities to impose any sanctions.

Instead, Alexis Tsipras led Greece towards a third Memorandum, with disastrous effects. The third Memorandum made living conditions even worse for the population, accelerated the sale of part of their country’s heritage to foreign private companies, overrode the normal functions of Greece’s political institutions using systematic recourse to “catch-all” laws imposed by the Troika, and obliged Greece to continue repaying a clearly odious debt Odious Debt According to the doctrine, for a debt to be odious it must meet two conditions:
1) It must have been contracted against the interests of the Nation, or against the interests of the People, or against the interests of the State.
2) Creditors cannot prove they they were unaware of how the borrowed money would be used.

We must underline that according to the doctrine of odious debt, the nature of the borrowing regime or government does not signify, since what matters is what the debt is used for. If a democratic government gets into debt against the interests of its population, the contracted debt can be called odious if it also meets the second condition. Consequently, contrary to a misleading version of the doctrine, odious debt is not only about dictatorial regimes.

(See Éric Toussaint, The Doctrine of Odious Debt : from Alexander Sack to the CADTM).

The father of the odious debt doctrine, Alexander Nahum Sack, clearly says that odious debts can be contracted by any regular government. Sack considers that a debt that is regularly incurred by a regular government can be branded as odious if the two above-mentioned conditions are met.
He adds, “once these two points are established, the burden of proof that the funds were used for the general or special needs of the State and were not of an odious character, would be upon the creditors.”

Sack defines a regular government as follows: “By a regular government is to be understood the supreme power that effectively exists within the limits of a given territory. Whether that government be monarchical (absolute or limited) or republican; whether it functions by “the grace of God” or “the will of the people”; whether it express “the will of the people” or not, of all the people or only of some; whether it be legally established or not, etc., none of that is relevant to the problem we are concerned with.”

So clearly for Sack, all regular governments, whether despotic or democratic, in one guise or another, can incur odious debts. . Syriza caused such disappointment that it enabled the hard Right to return to power in the July 2019 elections.

The lesson to be learnt is that at every crucial stage, there was an alternative option which ought to have been implemented, for what did happen was not inevitable.

For the alternatives to come about, self-organization and actions initiated by the population constitute the condition sine qua non. During this period of crisis in capitalist society, large sectors of the population are seeking radical solutions because they are aware that without them, their living conditions will continue to worsen, as will the global situation.

 Lessons for struggle in Europe and elsewhere

Over the past decade, popular anger has been expressed without interruption against discriminatory and anti-democratic policies in favour of the rich and of large corporations–policies which are implemented by national governments and often coordinated by the European Union [9]. This discontent has been reflected in initiatives by trade unions, but also by new movements such as “15M” in Spain (also called, in other countries, the “Indignados” movement), the occupation of the squares in Greece and the huge demonstrations in Portugal in 2011, the movements against the “Loi Travail” (Labour law) in France (which led to the “Nuit Debout” movement) and against the Water Tax in Ireland in 2016, and the great demonstrations for autonomy and against political repression in Catalonia in 2017. Feminist struggles have given rise to historic demonstrations in Poland (the “Czarny Protest” against the anti-abortion law in 2017), Italy (the “Non Una di Meno” movement since 2016), Spain (the feminist general strike of five million people on 8 March 2018), as well as a victory over the political influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland with the legalization of abortion by referendum in May 2018; they are at last succeeding in imposing their centrality in all social struggles. The year 2018 also saw the emergence of new social movements against the dominant economic and political order, with the movement against the “slavery law” (neoliberal reform of labour laws) in Hungary, the demonstration and development of the “Indivisible” antiracist movement in Germany, and the “Yellow Vest” movement in France and French-speaking Belgium against unfair tax policies and the lack of democracy in political institutions. Nor should we forget the climate demonstrations, driven mainly by young people who have gone on strike in many countries, including Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, France and Great Britain. All these social movements, and others, have challenged the austerity measures and authoritarianism of the policies that are implemented in Europe by posing directly or indirectly the question of a radical alternative social project to capitalism, productivism, ecological devastation, racism and patriarchy. This [ReCommonsEurope] Manifesto sees itself as an integral part of these movements and shares their objectives: the struggle against all forms of domination, for universal rights, for equality and for a democracy to be invented–a democracy which does not stop at the gates of companies and the threshold of working-class areas, and which is radically opposed to the logic of a capitalist system (whether the latter claims to be “protectionist,” and so against “foreigners,” or “liberal”) which destroys social rights and the environment.

These social movements are inseparable from the social, ecological, democratic and feminist emergencies, as well as a “crisis of solidarity.” A social emergency because the living and working conditions of the popular classes have continuously deteriorated over the last forty years, most notably since the crisis which affected the continent in 2008–2009. An ecological emergency because the exponential consumption of fossil fuels required by capitalism, and its corollary, the destruction of ecosystems, threaten the very existence of humanity. A democratic emergency because the dominant classes have not hesitated to adopt methods of domination which ignore democratic appearances to an ever greater degree, and are increasingly repressive, in response to the challenges they have been faced with over the last thirty years. A feminist emergency because patriarchal oppression in all its forms is rejected by millions of women and men. A crisis of solidarity because the closing of borders and building of walls as a response to the millions of migrants fleeing war, poverty, environmental disasters and authoritarian regimes world wide constitute nothing less than a denial of humanity. Each of these emergencies leads, in response, to mass civil disobedience, self-organization and the building of alternatives, which represent possible sources of democratic alternatives in Europe.

Our reflections and our determination to act are solidly rooted in these Europe-wide movements, without limiting themselves to existing borders and institutions: all the challenges and rights mentioned have become global. These take different forms in each country and on each continent, with their own specificities and histories. Social attacks are articulated from the “local” to the “global” depending on the strategies of both multinational companies and their interest Interest An amount paid in remuneration of an investment or received by a lender. Interest is calculated on the amount of the capital invested or borrowed, the duration of the operation and the rate that has been set. groups within national states and the institutions of globalized capitalism, based on the norms of so-called “free trade.”

The response of most governments to the growing protest movements consists of increasing the level of state repression: social and political opponents are threatened in Greece; in France and Belgium laws restricting freedoms follow one another and occurrences of police violence become more and more frequent, refugee rights activists are criminalized, etc. Far-right xenophobic and authoritarian forces have made considerable progress and even participate in European governments (as in Italy), or shape the political agenda of governments of the “extreme centre” (as in France). The European institutions have never protected capitalist interests so actively and have never erected so many barriers against popular intervention or democratic choice as in the last few years. In Greece, they responded to the electoral victory of Syriza in January 2015 by a policy of monetary asphyxiation (drying up of state liquidity Liquidity The facility with which a financial instrument can be bought or sold without a significant change in price. ); then, after the success of the “no” vote in the referendum of July 2015, held negotiations behind closed doors with the same government in order to neutralize the will of the people and, with the complicity of the Greek government, impose on them a third austerity memorandum. With the signature of agreements on migration policy between the EU and third-party countries such as the agreement with Turkey of April 2016, these institutions have added to the injustice of the Dublin III Regulation and the violence of Frontex (the agency organizing the repression of migrants at the frontiers of the EU) the systematic violation of international law, especially the law of asylum, and direct funding of a repressive policy delegated to third-party countries. Today, the leading projects for a “reform” of the EU are militarist (increasing the budget of Euroforce), anti-democratic (automaticity of European control of national budgets) and even more, neoliberal (projects for generalized privatization of public services). More than ever, as stated in 2015 by the then president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, from the point of view of the European institutions, “there cannot be a democratic choice against the European treaties.”

Faced with the pro-capitalist, anti-democratic and xenophobic construction which is the EU, what is to be done? Reform through elections at the European level is not a realistic option. A (very) hypothetical majority for a radical left coalition in the European Parliament would not make it possible to impose modifications in the most important treaties and democratic control on the European Commission and the ECB, which are the two main war machines of neoliberalism in Europe. The Parliament, in reality, does not possess the necessary prerogatives for such reforms, and the ECB and the European Commission, as well as the European Court of Justice and the various European agencies, are completely independent of popular sovereignty. And the simultaneous election in most member states of governments committed to reforming the EU seems equally illusory, if only because of the different temporality of electoral cycles. The European Union today constitutes not only a vanguard of neoliberalism in the world but also a set of unreformable institutions, which is why a Left committed to social transformation can no longer be credible and realistic without placing a complete break with the treaties and institutions of the European Union at the heart of its strategy.

But what forms should this rupture take? We already know that it cannot consist of negotiating a consensus without being in a position of strength in face of the European institutions, as the experience of the first Syriza government in 2015 clearly showed. We also know that political ruptures necessarily rely on social mobilizations on a large scale. Such mobilizations were cruelly lacking in Greece at the beginning of 2015, and they could have created the conditions for the campaign for Brexit to take a different direction from the nationalist and xenophobic one which unfortunately prevailed in the UK in 2016. In other words, breaking with the treaties and the institutions of the European Union will necessarily be confrontational, democratic and internationalist. This Manifesto argues that it is necessary and possible to simultaneously oppose the forces and policies of inequality and reaction (which advance under cover both of liberalism and protectionism) at national, European and international levels, relying on both the initiative of citizens and organized social movements and on the action of a people’s government committed to defending rights for all.

What is still needed, however, is for what is called in Europe the “radical Left” to raise its game in order to face up to today’s challenges. Taken as a whole, its constituent parts so far cruelly lack clarity and courage in their relationship to the European institutions, radicality and ambition in the measures they advocate, and a popular base as a result of their isolation from the social movements which are challenging the existing order from below. It is time, at local, national and international levels, to discuss the measures and realistic and radical initiatives which, if implemented, would really make it possible to meet social needs, guarantee the fundamental rights of the men and women living in Europe or desiring to do so, improve their living and working conditions, conquer democratic power and begin the process of going beyond capitalism while starting the ecological transition.

Our side must refuse both the unrealistic projects of institutional reform of the European institutions, which in the final analysis only reinforce the status quo, and projects based on a retreat into the nation-state, which end up by merely reinforcing domestic capital. A popular left-wing force which intends to form a people’s government and undertake the process of urgent social change must commit itself to disobeying the institutions of the EU, breaking with its normal processes. That force must defend itself against attacks and reprisals coming from the European institutions and big capital, like their attempts to block the process by national institutions wedded to the existing order. That force must work towards new international alliances with partners inside and outside the existing EU with a view to creating new forms of cooperation and solidarity. Popular sovereignty can only be built by confronting the present forms of political institutions at national, European and international levels, and by creating new democratic institutions through organization from below. For that to happen, we must win the argument that a clear political break is needed with the national, European and international institutions, which are vehicles for the policies we are fighting. We must also consolidate the links between networks, forms of resistance and the political, social and trade union movements which share the objectives of progressive and radical change, in particular in order to have an influence on a European level. The immediate and urgent task is to reinforce and coordinate the existing initiatives of disobedience, rupture and self-organization, and to initiate new ones, systematically giving them an international dimension, making sure they are clearly opposed to the institutions that serve capital and work in favour of new forms of solidarity between peoples.

By making these proposals for disobeying and breaking with the European institutions, there can be no question of looking towards a nationalist solution to the crisis and to social revolt. As much as in past periods, we need to adopt an internationalist strategy and advocate a European federation of peoples as opposed to pursuing the present course of integration which is completely dominated by the interests of big capital. We should also constantly develop coordinated campaigns and actions at the continental level and beyond in the fields of debt, ecology, the right to housing, treatment of migrants and refugees, health, education and other public services, and the right to work. Struggles must be led to close nuclear power plants, drastically reduce the use of fossil fuels, ban taxation dumping and tax havens, socialize the banks, insurance companies and the energy sector, re-appropriate the commons, defend and extend the rights of women and LGBTI people, promote public goods and services, launch constituent processes. It is more urgent than ever to take action against the ever-increasing authoritarianism of governments and for democracy in every area of social life.

It will no doubt be objected that such proposals are too radical or too difficult. We reply that any other is a dead end, and that ours is the only one which makes it possible to start the process of breaking with the existing order, now and everywhere it may be possible, in order to rebuild local, regional, national and international spaces, and beyond that, a world which is liveable, fair and democratic.