Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt

Introduction

In 2022, there were around 51 million people who were born outside of the country living in the United States, and nearly 11 million irregular migrants (Passel and Krogstad, 2024). With the return of Trump to the US presidency, what will immigration policy in the United States look like? Mass media and liberal scholars warn of harsh immigration policy, stricter border security, and mass deportations. Conversely, more cautious scholars have done assessments on Trump’s gap in his political narrative during his campaigns versus his real policies carried out during his former presidential period (Pierce and Selee, 2017; Bolter, Israel, and Pierce, 2022). Following this more cautious second line of thought, using a comparative historical approach, this paper describes Trump’s possible policy stance on immigration with regards to three aspects: 1) foreign labor force in the United States; 2) refugees and asylees, and 3) enforcement in the United States and Mexico.

Foreign labor force living in the United States

D. Trump had stated that he would combat irregular as well as regular migration (Pierce and Selee 2017; Bolter, Israel, and Pierce 2022). However, the portion of the US labor force comprised of people who were born in other countries has grown since 1994 until the present day, and Trump’s first term did not mark any change in this regard. While Duzhak (2023) has noted the positive effect that international migration has had on US economic growth after the Covid-19 pandemic, there might be evidence of a positive effect from international migration on US economic growth as far back as 2008.

Migrants have not only contributed financially by paying taxes and spending in the United States economy but have also provided an unskilled and skilled labor force which helps easy labor shortages in the United States. The left graph in Figure 1 shows the number of people in the United States labor force who were born abroad, and the right graph shows the number of people employed who were born abroad. The graphs show data from 1994 to the second quarter of 2024, and the grey areas represent a presidential period under the republican party. At the beginning of Trump’s first term, the foreign labor force was around 28.7 million foreigners, which then grew to around 30 million in 2019. Similarly, employment for foreign people living in the United States was 27.3 million at the beginning of the 2017 and grew to around 29 million in 2019. Both the labor force born abroad and the corresponding employment grew during Trump’s first presidential term until a decrease during the Covid-19 pandemic. It is worth noting that the labor force and employment indicators plotted in Figure 1 have undergone two noticeable declines–during the 2008 economic crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Notably, regardless of which political party held presidential office in the United States, the number of people born abroad participating in the US labor force has increased since 1994 and has been an important factor in achieving economic growth for the United States.

Figure 1. Labor Force and Employed People Living in the United States Born Abroad (1994-2024) (Millions)

Source: own estimations based on Flood et. al 2023

United States relies on international migration for its economic growth and, specifically, it needs more qualified international migration after the economic shocks like in 2008. Figure 2 depicts the labor force living in the United States born abroad from 1994 to the second quarter of 2024. The foreign labor force with a high school degree or less increased under G.W. Bush’s presidency but later stagnated for almost ten years (see Levine 2015) [1]. The pattern of behavior for the less qualified labor force mirrors that of Mexican immigration to the United States. At the beginning of 1999, the Mexican labor force in the United States was 4.6 million, and in 2008 it was around 8 million, and then it nearly remained the same level until 2024, around 8.1 million. [2] Interestingly, the political party of the presidency has not mattered, as can be seen with a steady increase in the qualified labor force from 1.4 million in 1994 to nearly 5.8 million in the present day in the United States. The pattern seen in the international labor force in the United States indicates that there are social and economic structures that political parties cannot easily break, and that skilled immigration benefits the United States; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 2024 Economic Outlook (2024) even highlights the importance of migration policy for developed countries. To conclude, the United States relies on qualified foreign labor, and Bolter, Israel and Pierce (2022) may be right in noting that Trump’s objective may be to prevent low-income immigration, rather than to prohibit immigration altogether.

Figure 2. Labor Force and Employed People Living in the United States Born Abroad by Educational Attainment (1994-2024) (Millions)

Note: ‘Until High School’ includes people who did not attend college. ‘More than High School until Bachelor’s degree’ includes people who attended some college but did not obtain a degree, people with an associate degree, and people with a bachelor’s degree. ‘More than Bachelor’s degree’ includes people who received a master’s degree, professional school degree, and doctorate degree.
Source: own estimations based on Flood et. al 2023

Refugee and Asylum Seekers

Refugee and asylum policy was harsh under Trump’s 2017-2020 administration. [3] As Wasen noted (2020, 246), Trump became the first elected president in the United States that “made opposition to the admission of refugees and asylees a centerpiece of their platform.” In addition, Wasen (2020) commented that Trump has emphasized that refugees and asylees could endanger the United States; according to Trump, all Muslim people were terrorists, and all Central American people could be criminals. In Trump’s narrative, he has denied the existence of global social problems of inequality as well as the increasing numbers of forced displacement. Trump has rejected the idea that many people cannot live in their home countries anymore due to violence, natural disasters, political conflicts, and/or international interventions.

In the 2017-2020 period, policies were established against refugees and asylees. These policies can be divided into two categories: domestic and external (see Bolter, Israel, and Pierce, 2022). First of all, the domestic policies which were created to stop asylees are: (1) metering, which is a ceiling to the number people in the ports of entry who can make an asylum claim established by US Custom and Border Protection officials (CBP) [4]; (2) the Transit-Country Asylum Ban, which instated a rule making people ineligible to ask for asylum in the United States if they had been rejected asylum in another country; and (3) Prompt Asylum Case Review (PACR) for non-Mexicans and Humanitarian Asylum Review Program (HARP) for Mexicans, both of which are programs focusing on accelerating the process of removing people from US territory. Secondly, external policies include: (1) asylum cooperation agreements, especially with countries such as northern Central American countries, (2) cooperation agreements with countries like Mexico, such as the Migration Protection Protocols forcing asylum seekers to fulfill their processes in Mexico, and (3) enforcement cooperation with Mexico to decrease the number of people who could reach the US border. Figure 3 shows refugee ceilings established by the US government from 2001 until 2024 in fiscal years and the real number of people accepted by the United States. Clearly, during Trump’s first administration both the ceiling and the number of refugees admitted severely declined. It is apparent that Trump fulfilled his promises regarding lowering the number of refugees and asylees admitted into the US.

Figure 3. Ceilings and Refugees Admitted into the United States (2001-2024) (Thousand)

Note: US Fiscal Years, from October 1 to September 30
Source: Refugee Processing Center 2024 and U.S. Department of State 2024.

Enforcement

Enforcement has been one of the pillars of Trump’s campaign, which has three dimensions; two of which are domestic and one is external. Firstly, the domestic dimension of enforcement includes: (1) encounters on the northern and southern border of the United States, including apprehensions (Title 8) and expulsions (Title 42) carried out by the CBP and the Office of Field Operations (OFO); and (2) removals and returns where, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2024), removals are the “the compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable noncitizen out the United States based on an order of removal,” and returns are “the confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable noncitizen out of the United States not based on an order of removal.” And finally, a third dimension of enforcement is encouraging other countries to enforce harsh migration policies; for example, a stricter Mexican policy in processing transit migrants and removing these transit migrants to their home countries. Next, I outline these manifestations of domestic and external enforcement.

During Trump’s first presidential period, there was not a clear pattern of enforcement compared to democratic counterparts. Figure 4 depicts encounters during Trump’s administration, which skyrocketed in the second half of 2019, and after there was an obvious decline during the Covid-19 emergency; however, it is evident that encounters during Biden’s administration remained quite high, even higher than during Trump’s first administration. Similarly, removals and returns totaled around 1.8 million cases during Trump’s administration which was a lower amount than any period of Obama’s administration (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. South Land Border Encounters (2012-2024) (Top) and Removed and Returned People by US Authorities (2000-2022) (Bottom) (Thousand)

Note: US Fiscal Years, from of October 1 to September 30
Source: own elaboration with data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2024

Will Trump’s administration attempt to force Mexico to increase its enforcement? Anguiano Téllez and Cruz Piñeiro (2016), Bartnik (2022), Cárdenas Palomino (2023), and Isidro Luna and López Vega (2023) have noted that since the 1990s, Mexico has increased its surveillance of transit migrants, and this surveillance especially increased in 2001 after the reformulation of US southern border security with the establishment of Plan Sur, Operación Centinela, and Plan Puebla Panamá in 2001; the Iniciativa Mérida in 2007; and the Plan Frontera Sur in 2014. Furthermore, two more facts make it clear that Mexico is cooperating with the United States to prevent international migration (U.S. Department of State 2024): 1) partnering with the United States in programs such as Sembrando vida, Sembrando oportunidades, and Jóvenes construyendo el futuro; and 2) Mexico’s commitment to invest US$ 1.5 billion in border infrastructure during the 2022-2024 period. Figure 5 shows people presented and removed to their home countries by Mexican migration authorities. Despite more than 30 years of strict migration policy by the Mexican government, presented and returned people by Mexican authorities have had several peaks in 2015 with 198 thousand presented and 181 thousand returned people, in 2019 (concomitant to the first period of Trump) with 182 thousand presented and 149 thousand returned people, and skyrocketing in 2023 with 564 thousand presented and 215 thousand returned people. Enforcement in Mexico during Trump’s first presidential term was comparable to Obama’s administration, and significantly lower than during Biden’s administration. Thus, we can arrive to the same conclusion as before that international migration to the United States has social and economic patterns that are not easily broken by political parties.

Figure 5. People Presented and Removed to their Home Countries by Mexican Migration Authorities (Thousand)

Source: Own elaboration with data from Unidad de Política Migratoria, Registro e Identidad de Personas 2024

Conclusion

One of the pillars of Trump’s campaigns has been a strong stance on immigration to the United States. Politicians have always had a gap between their narrative and the real policies that they carry out. In Trump’s case during the 2017-2020 period, he did not fulfill his campaign promises: (1) there were no mass deportations, and (2) Mexican enforcement was comparable to those during Obama’s and Biden’s administrations. Moreover, despite Trump’s narrative to also curb legal immigration, it is still evident that there is a stable flow of highly skilled migrants to the United States.

On the other hand, there was a decline in the number of refugees and asylees during the first Trump administration; therefore, it is possible that there will be stricter migration policies for people who have been victims of wars, natural disasters or economic problems, and international interventions. What would happen if Trump did fulfill all his promises in his narrative? Migration crises in Mexico are not new, during the 2008 economic crisis where almost 859 thousand Mexicans returned, and right now Mexico is amid a transit migration crisis with many reports of human rights violations. The main conclusion of this short article is that, regardless of which political party holds the US presidency, international migration follows a broader social structure and, therefore, it should be a central issue on the international agenda and addressed with a humane perspective.

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