Sri Lanka’s ISB Restructuring

10 February 2025 by Dhanusha Gihan Pathirana


Photo credit : Sushovan Dhar

CADTM is happy to republish this paper, which is extremely valuable in comprehending the arrangement reached by former Sri Lankan authorities with bondholders two days before the September 2024 presidential elections.



Key Takeaways

  • The extended maturity period masks significant increases in total interest payments. From 2028,, the weighted coupon rate of interest can climb to 6.8% and following 2032, the rates surge up to 9.75% for the next six years.
  • By relying on the Net Present Value analysis method, analysts and policymakers risk underestimating the true cost of debt restructuring.
  • Under the bondholder agreement-in-principle, Sri Lanka has effectively waived the legal right to secure a higher debt cancellation, creditors hold the right to alter the current governing law of Sri Lanka’s outstanding ISBs. There is no evidence that the external financial advisors of the government, who have a close commercial relationship with creditors, are working in the best interests of the people of Sri Lanka.
  • Lender awareness that Sri Lanka debt exceeded government revenue by a factor of ten, is a clear indication of predatory lending practices. Established norms in lending were blatantly violated by creditors.

Dhanusha Gihan Pathirana

is attached to the Institute of Political Economy.

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