We already knew who benefitted from the Greek Bailout

9 May by Daniel Munevar

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In recent days, a study conducted at the Berlin-based ESMT (European School of Management and Technology) has attracted significant media attention. |1|

The report focuses on the analysis of the distribution of bailout funds lent to Greece since 2010. It concludes that out of the 215 billion Euros provided to Greece, in the framework of the first two assistance programs, only 9.7 billion or 5% of the total was used to support the Greek budget. The rest of the resources were either used for the purpose of debt repayments, interest Interest An amount paid in remuneration of an investment or received by a lender. Interest is calculated on the amount of the capital invested or borrowed, the duration of the operation and the rate that has been set. payments and bank recapitalization Recapitalization Reconstituting or increasing a company’s share capital to reinforce its equity after losses. When the banks were bailed out by the European States, they were most often recapitalized with no conditions attached and without the States having the decision-making power their participation in the banks’ capital should have given them. . The distribution of bailout funds doesn’t change much with the third financial assistance program to Greece. This new program contemplates total disbursements of 86 billion Euros, of which 91% will be devoted to the same purposes as outlined above. Thus, as it turns out, it’s the country creditors who have stood to benefit from the bailouts, not the Greek people.

As interesting as it may be to see a conservative German institution making this point, we already knew it. These results broadly stand in line with the findings of Truth Committee on Public Debt established by the Hellenic Parliament in April of 2015. Even more relevant, and forgotten, is the fact that the IMF IMF
International Monetary Fund
Along with the World Bank, the IMF was founded on the day the Bretton Woods Agreements were signed. Its first mission was to support the new system of standard exchange rates.

When the Bretton Wood fixed rates system came to an end in 1971, the main function of the IMF became that of being both policeman and fireman for global capital: it acts as policeman when it enforces its Structural Adjustment Policies and as fireman when it steps in to help out governments in risk of defaulting on debt repayments.

As for the World Bank, a weighted voting system operates: depending on the amount paid as contribution by each member state. 85% of the votes is required to modify the IMF Charter (which means that the USA with 17,68% % of the votes has a de facto veto on any change).

The institution is dominated by five countries: the United States (16,74%), Japan (6,23%), Germany (5,81%), France (4,29%) and the UK (4,29%).
The other 183 member countries are divided into groups led by one country. The most important one (6,57% of the votes) is led by Belgium. The least important group of countries (1,55% of the votes) is led by Gabon and brings together African countries.

http://imf.org
was well aware of this situation before it decided to participate in the first program of financial assistance to Greece in 2010. An assessment of the risks of lending to Greece provided to the Executive Board of the IMF by its technical staff in May 6th of 2010, just days before the first program was approved, raised a stern warning regarding the composition of the creditors of the country. Out of the 150 billion Euros of Greek public debt, 80% was owed to external creditors. In turn, European banks held 89% of this debt: French banks accounted for 36% of the claims, German banks 21%, with other European banks accounting for the remaining 21%. |2|

Given that the proposed program for Greece by the IMF explicitly excluded the option of a debt restructuring it becomes clear why the IMF staff included these figures in their report. As they were unable to certify the sustainability of Greek debt upon completion of the program, the provision of official funds would simply help to shift losses among creditors. Official funds would be used to bailout private creditors as they liquidate their exposure to the country. In turn, the remaining private creditors would end up facing higher losses on their bond Bond A bond is a stake in a debt issued by a company or governmental body. The holder of the bond, the creditor, is entitled to interest and reimbursement of the principal. If the company is listed, the holder can also sell the bond on a stock-exchange. portfolio once the unsustainable character of the debt translates into a debt restructuring. By supporting an unequal distribution of the losses among private creditors, the IMF would be encouraging precisely the type of moral hazard Moral hazard The effect on a creditor’s or an economic actor’s behaviour when they are covered against a given risk. They will be more likely to take risks. Thus, for example, rescuing banks without placing any conditions enhances their moral hazard.

An argument often used by opponents of debt-cancellation. It is based on the liberal theory which considers a situation where there is a borrower and a lender as a case of asymmetrical information. Only the borrower knows whether he really intends to repay the lender. By cancelling the debt today, there would be a risk that the same facility might be extended to other debtors in future, which would increase the reticence of creditors to commit capital. They would have no other solution than to demand a higher interest rate including a risk premium. Clearly the term “moral”, here, is applied only to the creditors and the debtors are automatically suspected of “amorality”. Yet it is easily demonstrated that this “moral hazard” is a direct result of the total liberty of capital flows. It is proportionate to the opening of financial markets, as this is what multiplies the potentiality of the market contracts that are supposed to increase the welfare of humankind but actually bring an increase in risky contracts. So financiers would like to multiply the opportunities to make money without risk in a society which, we are unceasingly told, is and has to be a high-risk society… A fine contradiction.
that its lending rules were to prevent.

In the event, these rules were changed in May 10th of 2010 in order to allow the participation of the IMF in the Greek financial assistance program. To accomplish this, European members of the Executive Board made an additional commitment. On the face of reservations by several non-European members of the Executive Board regarding the chances of success of the Greek program, the Dutch, French and German chairs conveyed the commitment “of their commercial banks to support Greece and broadly maintain their exposures”. |3| In other words they provided assurance that their banks would not use the opportunity offered by official funding to dump their exposure to the country and shift the losses of a restructuring onto the rest of the private creditors. The ink on the agreement wasn’t dry when banks from these countries dumped their Greek bonds and ran for the exit. As a result, their losses were minimized whereas the exposure of Greek banks and pension funds Pension Fund
Pension Funds
Pension funds: investment funds that manage capitalized retirement schemes, they are funded by the employees of one or several companies paying-into the scheme which, often, is also partially funded by the employers. The objective is to pay the pensions of the employees that take part in the scheme. They manage very big amounts of money that are usually invested on the stock markets or financial markets.
continued to increase. Once the debt restructuring operation of 2012 was concluded, the costs of rescuing Greek banks increased accordingly whereas pension funds suffered massive losses on their portfolios.

Even though it might appear that these are minor historical curiosities, these issues hold a significant relevance in the context of the tensions observed in recent months between the IMF and European authorities. The IMF began its participation in the program in 2010, despite reservations by staff and members of the Executive Board, on the basis of what turned out to be false reassurances from European countries. As the situation in the country has steadily deteriorated over the past 6 years, opposition has built up within the organization. It is no coincidence that the IMF refused to provide fresh funds in the context of the third MoU until it could ensure the sustainability of Greek debt according to its technical criteria. Furthermore, to limit the capacity of European members to pressure the IMF, the Executive Board changed again in January of this year the lending rules of the organization to ensure that once again debt sustainability is a necessary condition to access funds.

Under this light, the outcome of the negotiations between Greece and its creditors its far from certain. If recent history is any guide, its unlikely that any definitive solution will be found on the coming weeks. The most likely scenario is that as the IMF digs its heels on its position, which is the subject of an entirely different article, negotiations will drag down until July when Greece has payments for over 2 billion Euros to the ECB ECB
European Central Bank
The European Central Bank is a European institution based in Frankfurt, founded in 1998, to which the countries of the Eurozone have transferred their monetary powers. Its official role is to ensure price stability by combating inflation within that Zone. Its three decision-making organs (the Executive Board, the Governing Council and the General Council) are composed of governors of the central banks of the member states and/or recognized specialists. According to its statutes, it is politically ‘independent’ but it is directly influenced by the world of finance.

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html
. In this context, what it becomes clear is how cynical is the opposition of the Eurogroup to grant debt relief to Greece on the scale required by the IMF. The members of the Eurogroup are well aware of the original purpose of the Greek bailout as most of these funds were used to rescue their banks. They knew that they were approving loans to a de-facto insolvent country. Thus their insistence in demanding payment in full in exchange of additional painful, and ultimately fruitless, austerity measures can only be described as irrational.


Footnotes

|1| Rocholl, J., & Stahmer, A. (2016). Where did the Greek bailout money go? ESMT No. WP–16–02. Retrieved May 8, 2016, from https://www.esmt.org/where-did-gree...

|2| IMF. (2010). Greece—Assessment of the Risks to the Fund and the Fund’s Liquidity Position. Retrieved May 8, 2016, from http://www.elibrary.imf.org/abstrac...

|3| IMF. (2010). Office Memorandum - Board meeting on Greece’s request for an SBA - May 9th, 2010. Retrieved May 8, 2016, from http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/...

Author

Daniel Munevar

is a 30-year-old post-Keynesian economist from Bogotá, Colombia. MPAff. LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. From March to July 2015 he worked as a close aide to former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, advising him on issues of fiscal policy and debt sustainability. He was previously fiscal advisor to the Ministry of Finance of Colombia and special advisor on Foreign Direct Investment for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador. He is considered to be one of the foremost figures in the study of Latin American public debt. He is member of CADTM AYNA.


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