Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt

Why do Washington’s leaders consider China to be the main adversary?

For nearly 40 years (dating back to the Nixon-Mao agreements of the 1970s), China has been committed to maintaining the international capitalist order and, since the 2010s, has adopted an economic and trade policy of international expansion, gaining huge market shares around the world. It has partially opened its economy to massive foreign investment, particularly from large US, European and Taiwanese companies. For some twenty years, China was considered by the United States to be an attractive economic and trade partner, even though it was accumulating huge trade surpluses.

Then, China was no longer content with exporting manufactured goods and attracting foreign capital. From 2014 onwards, it invested heavily in the extraction and production of goods on a global scale (on all continents) and became a leading lender and investor (see Éric Toussaint, ‘Questions/answers on China as a major creditor power’, CADTM, published on 21 November 2024).

Faced with the decline of the US economy, the authorities in Washington decided to react aggressively to the strengthening of China, which, for its part, has so far used peaceful means to score points and strengthen its power. In various parts of the world, Washington has continued and increased its use of force, without however directly attacking China. During his second term, Trump decided to deploy an offensive economic, military and diplomatic strategy directed against China.

Washington has decided to react aggressively to the strengthening of China, which, for its part, has used peaceful means to strengthen its power

The turning point began at the end of Barack Obama’s term in 2015-2016 and became much more pronounced during Donald Trump’s first term (2017-2020) and continued during Joe Biden’s term (2021-2024). Trump’s return to the presidency in early 2025 has intensified the US offensive against China. In the document published by the Trump administration in early December 2025 (NSS 2025), China is effectively defined as a ‘core strategic adversary’.

Based on official documents, how has Washington’s official position on relations with China evolved over the past ten years?

In 2015, the administration led by Barack Obama stated:

“The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. We seek cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” (NSS 2015, p. 24)

Under Obama, the official discourse remained one of cooperative engagement, as shown in the 2015 NSS, but in reality, several developments already marked a shift towards designating China as an adversary. It was at the end of Obama’s term that the United States significantly strengthened its military and strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific/ Indo-Pacific.

In 2017, during Donald Trump’s first term, the focus on China continued and China was presented as a threat:

“The Indo-Pacific region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. interest Interest An amount paid in remuneration of an investment or received by a lender. Interest is calculated on the amount of the capital invested or borrowed, the duration of the operation and the rate that has been set. in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic. Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarise outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernisation campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China with a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.” (SSN 2017, pp. 45-46)

The 2017 NSS marks a doctrinal break: China is now described as a hostile and threatening power using economic coercion, political influence and militarisation to challenge the regional order and US leadership.

In the national security strategy document published in 2022, the Joe Biden administration continues D. Trump’s approach to China:

"The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mould global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce countries. It benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world.

 

The PRC is also investing in a military that is rapidly modernising, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific, and growing in strength and reach globally – all while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the region and around the world. (...) It is possible for the United States and the PRC to coexist peacefully, and share Share A unit of ownership interest in a corporation or financial asset, representing one part of the total capital stock. Its owner (a shareholder) is entitled to receive an equal distribution of any profits distributed (a dividend) and to attend shareholder meetings. in and contribute to human progress together (...) In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the decisive decade. We now stand at an inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future. Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the front lines of the PRC’s coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and prosperity. (...) We will hold Beijing accountable for abuses – genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms – even as it seeks to pressure countries and communities into silence. (...) We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence." (NSS 2022, pp. 23-24).

Although less bluntly, the Biden administration confirms and deepens the shift of 2017 by describing China as the main global strategic competitor, engaged in a long-term systemic rivalry affecting the economy, technology, security and international standards.

In the document released in early December 2025, the Trump administration further radicalises Washington’s policy towards China:

“President Trump single-handedly reversed more than three decades of mistaken American assumptions about China: namely, that by opening our markets to China, encouraging American business to invest in China, and outsourcing our manufacturing to China, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called “rules-based international order.” This did not happen. China got rich and powerful, and used its wealth and power to its considerable advantage. American elites—over four successive administrations of both political parties—were either willing enablers of China’s strategy or in denial.” (NSS 2025, p. 19)

Trump does not explicitly adopt a belligerent approach towards China, as we read in the national security strategy document:

‘If America remains on a growth path—and can sustain that while maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing (...)’ (NSS 2025, p. 20)

However, there are also some very negative passages regarding the direct threats posed by Chinese policy, with a whole range of accusations:

“First, the United States must protect and defend our economy and our people from harm, from any country or source. This means ending (among other things):

• Predatory, state-directed subsidies and industrial strategies;

• Unfair trading Market activities
trading Buying and selling of financial instruments such as shares, futures, derivatives, options, and warrants conducted in the hope of making a short-term profit. practices;

• Job destruction and deindustrialisation;

• Large-scale intellectual property theft and industrial espionage;

• Threats against our supply chains that risk U.S. access to critical resources, including minerals and rare earth elements;

• Exports of fentanyl precursors that fuel America’s opioid epidemic; and

• Propaganda, influence operations, and other forms of cultural subversion.” (NSS 2025, p. 21)

What message is Trump sending to Beijing?

In response to China’s strategy in the face of customs barriers and other economic obstacles erected by Washington to counter the expansion of Chinese trade and investment around the world and in the US market, Trump states in NSS 2025 (page 20) that the methods used by Beijing to circumvent the barriers and other obstacles imposed from 2027 onwards are identified... and considered hostile. The passage on China’s use of Mexico as a production location to then reach the United States, the substitution of the US market by that of low-income countries, and indirect exports sends a very clear message to Beijing that can be summarised as follows: We know exactly how you are circumventing our tariffs and controls. In response, we will impose new sanctions, exert pressure and coercion on intermediary countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, and challenge trade agreements with countries serving as relays for the Chinese.

Is Trump’s response purely economic?

Under Trump, China is seen as a structural adversary, against which the United States must implement a more aggressive strategy of economic confrontation and military competition.

What is Trump’s position on China in the Indo-Pacific?

First, it should be noted that the Indo-Pacific is largely a geopolitical or geostrategic space defined by Washington in its own interests. The military and economic dimensions are decisive in the adoption of this definition. Trump wants the Indo-Pacific to be ‘secure and dominated’ by the United States. Beijing prefers to use the term Asia-Pacific.

In the NSS 2025, the Indo-Pacific roughly corresponds to a continuous arc that stretches from west to east, encompassing the east coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean, key chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, South Asia (with India as the pivot), Southeast Asia (ASEAN), the South China Sea, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan. To the south and east are Australia, the archipelagos and island states of the Pacific. This area extends to the Pacific coast of the United States.

For Trump, the Indo-Pacific is above all a maritime and military area through which more than 60% of world trade passes. It is an essential area for energy, supply chains and naval supremacy. Within this region, Washington has a network of allied countries: Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan (which is officially part of China) and, to a certain extent, India, which is a key partner but not a formal ally. For Trump, this network must form an anti-Chinese front.

In Trump’s NSS 2025, US forces in the Indo-Pacific are conceived as a military, maritime and air force, primarily geared towards a high-intensity conflict with China. Although Trump presents this force as having only a deterrent role, this is not the case. Washington maintains the largest military deployment outside the American continent.

The United States deploys 375,000 soldiers [1] and civilian military personnel in the Indo-Pacific and maintains 66 permanent military bases, in addition to several dozen smaller military installations (see the official website of the United States Congress: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12604). Washington’s main military installations in the Indo-Pacific are located in Japan (air and naval bases, more than 50,000 soldiers), South Korea (more than 28,000 soldiers), and territories that belong directly to the United States, such as Guam (6,000 soldiers) in the Mariana Islands, Hawaii (44,000 troops), Alaska, etc., to which must be added access to military bases in the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia.

What is China’s position on the geostrategic space that Washington calls the Indo-Pacific?

China officially rejects the notion of the ‘Indo-Pacific’. In official Chinese discourse, Beijing does not spontaneously use the term ‘Indo-Pacific’; it prefers ‘Asia-Pacific’, ‘Asian neighbourhood’ and "community of destiny in Asia.

According to China, the Indo-Pacific is an artificial concept, forged by the United States, aimed at expanding and legitimising a strategy of containment against China (Quad [2] AUKUS [3], naval alliances). In Beijing’s view, the Indo-Pacific means Washington’s expansion of the anti-China theatre to India. For China, the Indo-Pacific serves to internationalise the Chinese question (mainland China and Taiwan), transform China into a global security problem and legitimise a massive American military presence. In short, for Beijing, the Indo-Pacific is not a natural region, but a hostile geopolitical construct.

For China, the United States is a foreign power in the region that is militarily encircling China, a foreign power that wants to hinder the free development of Chinese trade and investment in its natural geographical environment. Obviously, Washington takes a completely different view and considers that the United States has the right to dominate the Indo-Pacific and that China risks using its force to demand tolls, threaten the security of its neighbours and block supply chains.

What is the message contained in the NSS 2025 regarding Taiwan?

On the issue of Taiwan, the NSS 2025 reaffirms its opposition to any reunification by force, while explicitly refusing to support a declaration of Taiwanese independence. This stance is aimed less at stabilising the strait than at maintaining permanent leverage Leverage This is the ratio between funds borrowed for investment and the personal funds or equity that backs them up. A company may have borrowed much more than its capitalized value, in which case it is said to be ’highly leveraged’. The more highly a company is leveraged, the higher the risk associated with lending to the company; but higher also are the possible profits that it may realise as compared with its own value. over Beijing, turning Taiwan into a structural point of friction rather than an object of political settlement.

How do the Indian authorities view the Indo-Pacific?

New Delhi tends to use the term Indo-Pacific because it allows it to reinforce its status as an autonomous great power, to break out of its regional standoff with China, and to broaden its strategic horizon towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific. For India, the Indo-Pacific is a power multiplier, not simply an anti-Chinese tool. While participating in the Quad, India refuses to enter into formal military alliances, maintains its doctrine of strategic autonomy, and cooperates with Washington without completely aligning itself. Of course, it must be borne in mind that India is in conflict with its neighbour Pakistan, where China is investing heavily. India also has a border dispute with China. India is using the Indo-Pacific to respond to China’s presence in the Indian Ocean, in Pakistan (the port of Gwadar, which is connected to China by land), in Sri Lanka (the port of Hambantota, which is the subject of a 99-year concession granted to a Chinese company), and in the western Indian Ocean.

At the same time, India is a member of the BRICS BRICS The term BRICS (an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) was first used in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, then an economist at Goldman Sachs. The strong economic growth of these countries, combined with their important geopolitical position (these 5 countries bring together almost half the world’s population on 4 continents and almost a quarter of the world’s GDP) make the BRICS major players in international economic and financial activities. , along with China and Russia, and chair the group in 2026. India purchases significant quantities of fuel from Russia despite the sanctions imposed on Moscow since the invasion of Ukraine. Finally, Modi’s neo-fascist government has developed a close relationship (military and commercial) with the neo-fascist government in Israel.

Isn’t Trump’s message threatening? Indeed, isn’t he looking for a pretext, such as ensuring freedom of trade, in order to have an argument for attacking China militarily? This is reminiscent of the pretext for starting the Opium Wars in the 1830s. In the case of the Opium Wars, the US and other powers used free trade as a pretext, and this is still the case here, is it not?

This interpretation of Trump’s document is entirely legitimate, and it touches on a very sensitive point that many Western analyses downplay but which Chinese strategists see perfectly clearly. The short answer is: yes, the passage in NSS 2025 concerning freedom of maritime trade in the Indo-Pacific can be read as more threatening than the ‘defensive deterrence’ interpretation, and yes, the analogy with the ‘freedom of trade’ of the Opium Wars is relevant both theoretically and historically.

When Trump writes that the South China Sea should not be subject to arbitrary tolls or closures, he is doing three very significant things:
1. He is transforming a contested regional space into a global public good. This is exactly the historical mechanism of maritime powers: a space is denationalised, reclassified as a global artery, and then armed intervention is legitimised in the name of all. This is the same legal and strategic reasoning that was used by the British against Qing China in the 19^th century, or by Western powers against the Ottoman Empire, and more recently by the United States against Iran in the Gulf. ‘Freedom of trade’ thus becomes a principle superior to sovereignty.

2. Trump is setting a very low threshold for intolerance. He is not talking about a total blockade or a declared war for which China would be responsible, but about the risk of tolls, controls and the ability to close the sea at will, which China could hypothetically exercise or activate.

In other words, the presumed intention is enough. This is extremely important: China does not actually need to block the South China Sea to justify action. According to Trump’s doctrine, it is enough that it has the credible capacity to do so. This is exactly the type of strategic pretext that has been used in the past.

In the 19^th century, the argument of the Western imperialist powers against China was that ‘China violates free trade’; today, Trump’s argument is that ‘China threatens vital global trade routes’. In both cases, the West presents itself as the guardian of trade flows, while China is described as closed, coercive, arbitrary and dangerous to the global economy. To a Chinese reader, this passage sounds exactly like classic imperialist rhetoric. And it is entirely justified for a Chinese person to interpret it this way, as would any sensible person trying to decipher the NSS 2025.

3. Trump is actually preparing a justification for escalation, not immediate war. Trump is building a ‘legal and strategic box’. Trump is essentially saying: if China seeks to control, tax or close maritime routes, then the use of force would not be war, but an action to maintain global economic order. This is exactly what major powers do before conflicts, to prepare public opinion, align allies and reduce the political cost of escalation. Trump is reviving historically imperialist vocabulary, with ‘freedom of trade’ serving here as a higher principle justifying the use of force. This is perceived in Beijing as a latent threat, even as doctrinal preparation for escalation, even though the official reaction of the Chinese authorities to the NSS 2025 has been very moderate.

What was China’s official reaction in December 2025 to the publication of Trump’s NSS 2025?

The Chinese reaction was very courteous in order to avoid souring relations.
At a press conference on 8 December 2025, in the days following the publication of the NSS 2025, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said:

“China always believes that China and the US stand to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. Upholding mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation is the right way for China and the U.S. to get along with each other and is the only right and realistic choice. China stands ready to work with the U.S. to sustain the steady development of the bilateral relationship and at the same time will firmly defend its sovereignty, security and development interests. We hope the United Kingdom will work with China in the same direction, act on the important common understandings reached between heads of state of the two countries, step up dialogue and cooperation, properly manage differences, promote the steady, sound and sustainable development of China-United Kingdom relations, and inject more certainty and stability into the world.

 

On the Taiwan question, we stress that Taiwan is China’s Taiwan and is an inalienable part of China’s territory. The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people and Chinese people only that brooks no external interference. The US needs to earnestly abide by the one-China principle (...)" Source: https://af.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng./fyrth/202512/t20251208_11768841.htm? accessed on 10 January 2026.

China has also reacted cautiously to Washington’s claims in the NSS 2025 regarding the Western Hemisphere, particularly Venezuela.

What was China’s reaction to the US military aggression against Venezuela on 3 January 2026?

After Washington attacked Venezuela on 3 January 2026, China denounced Trump’s claims to take control of Venezuelan oil and demanded the immediate release of the presidential couple, but so far has taken no countermeasures to sanction the United States.

Summary-Conclusion

If Washington’s leaders now consider China to be their main adversary, it is not because Beijing has broken with the capitalist world order, but precisely because it has successfully integrated itself into it

The evolution of Washington’s official position towards China over the last decade highlights a major strategic shift that goes far beyond changes in administration or partisan orientation. In the space of ten years, China has gone from being a competitive but cooperative economic partner to a ‘core strategic adversary’ in official US discourse. This shift does not reflect a sudden break, but rather the culmination of a cumulative process linked to China’s economic, financial, technological and geopolitical rise within the global capitalist order itself.

Until the mid-2010s, the Obama administration still followed a logic of conditional integration of China into the US-dominated international order.

The shift that took place at the end of Obama last mandate and during Donald Trump’s first term consisted of explicitly rejecting this approach. Since then, China has been described as a hostile power using economics, investment, infrastructure and military modernisation to challenge American dominance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. This redefinition of China as a structural threat has continued and deepened under the Biden administration, which has taken up most of Trump’s diagnosis while placing it in a more assertive multilateral and ideological framework, contrasting a Chinese ‘authoritarian model’ with an international order presented as based on democratic values.

The 2025 strategy document marks a new stage: it no longer merely notes the rivalry, but explicitly points to the historic mistake made by US elites in facilitating China’s rise. China is now presented not only as a competitor, but as a direct threat to the US economy, social cohesion, supply chains, national security and even cultural stability. The conflict is thus extended to all economic, technological, ideological and societal spheres, without formally assuming a direct military option.

The Sino-American rivalry therefore appears less like a clash between two antagonistic systems than an asymmetrical struggle for leadership within the same global economic order, whose rules have long been written by the United States itself

Ultimately, if Washington’s leaders now consider China to be the main adversary, it is not because Beijing has broken with the global capitalist order, but precisely because it has successfully integrated itself into it, exploiting its mechanisms to the point of significantly eroding American supremacy. The Sino-American rivalry therefore appears less like a clash between two antagonistic systems than an asymmetrical struggle for leadership within the same global economic order, whose rules have long been written by the United States itself. This dynamic, marked by Washington’s aggressiveness, makes the confrontation lasting, structural and potentially very dangerous for all the peoples of the planet.

Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy 2025 marks a major doctrinal shift in the way the United States views its rivalry with China. Behind the rhetoric of deterrence, free trade and maritime security lies a more assertive logic of power, in which the United States, as an extra-regional power, claims the right to structure the Indo-Pacific militarily in order to preserve an economic order favourable to its interests. However, this approach may be interpreted in Beijing as a strategy of encirclement and coercion, reviving a profound security dilemma with historical, geopolitical and systemic implications.

The author would like to thank Omar Aziki, Patrick Bond Bond A bond is a stake in a debt issued by a company or governmental body. The holder of the bond, the creditor, is entitled to interest and reimbursement of the principal. If the company is listed, the holder can also sell the bond on a stock-exchange. , Sushovan Dhar, Fernanda Gadea and Maxime Perriot for their review.